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THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE:  
MOVING BEYOND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TO 
ACHIEVE EQUAL PROTECTION 
EMILY CHIANG† 
ABSTRACT 
 Since handing down Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development, the United States Supreme Court has significantly curtailed the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Many aca-
demics continue to talk about the standards governing intent and disparate impact. Some 
recent scholarship recognizes that reformers on the ground have shifted away from equality-
based claims altogether. This Article contends that civil rights advocates replaced the old 
equal protection framework some time ago and that they did so deliberately and with great 
success. It expands upon and refines the strategy shift some scholars have identified, with a 
particular focus on racial inequality, the foundation on which equal protection rests. It does 
so by focusing on three particularly timely reform movements: indigent defense reform, the 
fight to end the school-to-prison pipeline, and challenges to immigration-related laws. The 
Article uses these various reform movements to identify and analyze the true breadth of the 
new racial justice reformers have wrought.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Racial inequality endures in America. Whether the disparities—in 
education,1 employment,2 incarceration,3 or any number of other are-
as4—constitute inequity may be a matter of debate, but the fact of 
continued inequality is not.5 And yet, the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is increasingly ill suited to address this 
state of affairs. In the wake of decisions such as Washington v. Davis6 
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,7 
litigation seeking racial justice on the basis of disparate impact theories 
of discrimination under the Constitution has been all but foreclosed.8  
 A number of commentators have noted that those seeking to ad-
dress inequality have had to accommodate a Court and culture in-
                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1. 
 2. According to data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment 
rate for African Americans in 2011 and 2012 was roughly double than what it was for 
whites. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. 
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.htm (last modified Feb. 5, 2013). As others have 
noted, these statistics grossly underestimate the true African American unemployment 
rate, because they do not include prisoners. BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS 
INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS 52-53 (2012); BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 97 (2006); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 229 (The New 
Press rev. ed. 2012) (noting that the true jobless rate among noncollege black men during 
the 1990s was 42%, and 65% among black male dropouts). At the highest level, only thir-
teen African Americans have ever been chairperson or CEO of a Fortune 500 company. See 
African American Chairmen & CEO’s of Fortune 500 Companies, BLACK PROFILES, 
http://www.blackentrepreneurprofile.com/fortune-500-ceos/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2014).  
 3. In 2005, 2290 per 100,000 black people were incarcerated, compared to 412 white 
people, a ratio of approximately 5.6. See George Coppolo & Kevin McCarthy, Crime Rate 
and Conviction Rates Broken Down by Race, OLR RES. REP. (Jan. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0008.htm. African Americans make up 13% of the 
general U.S. population and constitute: 28% of all arrests; 40% of all inmates held in pris-
ons and jails; and 42% of the population on death row. See James E. Johnson et al., 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL 
PROSECUTIONS 20 n.1 (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
legacy/Justice/ProsecutorialDiscretion_report.pdf. 
 4. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the 2011 median household income was 
$55,412 for whites, $32,229 for blacks, and $38,624 for Hispanics. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT 
ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2011 8-9 (2012). The percentages of those below the poverty line were 
9.8% for non-Hispanic whites, 27.6% for blacks, and 25.3% for Hispanics. Id. at 14. 
 5. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 
982-89 (2010) (providing statistical evidence of racial disparity in poverty, income and 
wealth, homeownership, employment, education, and the criminal justice system). 
 6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 7. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 




creasingly discomfited by claims of group-based discrimination. This 
unease has variously been described as “pluralism anxiety,”9 an “an-
tibalkanization” perspective,10 and “the strain of difference.”11 Some 
of these scholars have in turn noted a shift in the Court’s jurispru-
dence; in Kenji Yoshino’s words, a shift from “group-based equality 
claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”12  
 The conversation about the future of equal protection and the 
meaning of equality has never been more important. This Article 
contends that the dialogue cannot be fully realized until we re-engage 
with the paradigmatic application of equal protection principles to 
race.13 It argues that racial justice advocates have engaged in a whole-
sale replacement of the equal protection framework over the last sev-
eral decades, and that they have done so deliberately and with great 
success. An understanding of the tools they used and the new racial 
justice they have built is to the benefit of all who seek equality. 
 This Article identifies and explores three frontiers in the new ra-
cial justice: public defense, the school-to-prison pipeline, and immi-
gration. Civil rights litigators have adapted to the Court’s restrictive 
equal protection jurisprudence without ceding the battle for racial 
equality in each of these areas, a fact made all the more remarkable 
for the endemic disparate racial impact at the heart of these prob-
lems. Their approach to these issues serves to highlight the variety of 
strategies at their disposal, many of which will be useful in other 
contexts. To procure public defense reform, they have relied upon 
other individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, the Sixth 
Amendment in particular. To fight the school-to-prison pipeline, they 
have used a rich federal statutory landscape to their advantage. And 
to challenge restrictive immigration bills, they have mustered struc-
tural arguments, such as federal preemption. 
 These claims have played a critical role in reducing the disparate 
racial impact of poor public defense systems, the school-to-prison 
pipeline, and punitive immigration laws—and they have done so by 
providing a true alternative to the Equal Protection Clause in the 
                                                                                                                  
 9. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (2011). 
 10. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground 
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1357 (2011). 
 11. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1531 (2002). 
 12. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 748.   
 13. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 781 (2002) (noting that “racial 
minorities and women have much to gain from a theory of discrimination that focuses on 
the harms of coerced assimilation” for lesbians and gay men). 
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form of remedies that are structural, prospective, and class-based in 
nature, not just individual and retrospective. Not only have these 
claims proven more successful than traditional, explicitly race-based 
claims, but they have not even been predicated upon racial inequali-
ty, much less inequity.14 
 Some scholars have questioned whether a race-neutral approach 
to race-based problems is appropriate, criticizing it as a misguided 
embrace of a “post-racial” society.15 This Article offers a response 
grounded in realpolitik: litigators have not given up the fight for ra-
cial justice, but their pleadings now work around the doctrinal dead 
end of explicitly race-based claims. Far from conceding the fight for 
racial justice, these advocates have embraced a strategy that rewrites 
the rules in their favor, resulting in real, measurable gains for equality. 
 Part II of this Article describes the death of the Equal Protection 
Clause as a useful means of vindicating racial justice claims. It un-
packs the commentary surrounding the cultural and doctrinal shifts 
in the Court’s jurisprudence that have made equal protection claims 
less appealing both to advocates and judges. It concludes that a re-
turn to the conversation about racial equality would enrich our un-
derstanding of equal protection for all groups and that this discussion 
should begin with what advocates on the ground have been doing. 
Part III of the Article identifies the primary ways in which civil 
rights litigators have continued to make strides in combating racial 
inequality without resorting to equal protection claims. It pairs areas 
in which disproportionate racial impact is rampant with the most 
meaningful alternatives to the Equal Protection Clause identified by 
reformers thus far. In each area, it outlines the scope of the disparate 
impact, the reform response, and the lessons each strategy has to 
offer for others. This narrative provides the contours of the new ra-
cial justice, which has evolved to combat the racial inequalities of the 
modern age. 
II.   THE DEATH OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE FOR CLAIMS 
PREMISED ON RACIAL DISPARITY 
 The aftermath of Washington v. Davis, which all but foreclosed 
claims of racial discrimination based upon a disparate impact theory, 
has been amply documented.16 This Part will provide a brief overview 
                                                                                                                  
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 239; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty 
Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 
1327-40 (2011). 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 




of the doctrine as it stands today and summarize the academic com-
mentary thus far as to the resultant state of civil rights work. 
A.   Disparate Impact After Davis  
 Any narrative of disparate impact claims must begin with Wash-
ington v. Davis17 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.18 In Davis, the Court held that administration of a 
test for authorities such as police officers did not violate equal protec-
tion despite the resultant exclusion of a disproportionate number of 
African American applicants:  
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends 
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a 
greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an in-
vidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Stand-
ing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are 
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny . . . .19 
The Court concluded that absent a showing of discriminatory in-
tent—that the state action was taken because of its disproportionate 
racial impact rather than in spite of it—disparate impact is insuffi-
cient as grounds for relief.20 It noted that there is no requirement that 
“the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or ap-
pear on the face of the statute” and that such purpose could “often be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it 
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”21 
 One term later in Arlington Heights, the Court explained that 
plaintiffs must be able to offer “proof that a discriminatory purpose 
has been a motivating factor in the decision” being challenged and 
that absent a “stark” pattern of disparate impact, courts would have 
to delve into factors such as the historical background of the decision, 
the sequence of events leading to the decision, substantive and pro-
cedural departures from the normal operating procedure, and the 
legislative and administrative history.22 
 Davis and Arlington Heights both dealt with state action in which 
the state could plausibly contend the disparate impact was unfore-
                                                                                                                  
 17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 18. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 19. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (internal citation omitted). 
 20. Id. at 239. 
 21. Id. at 241-42. 
 22. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-67. 
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seeable, and thus in which evidence of discriminatory intent would 
prove elusive. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feen-
ey,23 the Court confronted state action that would inevitably and in-
variably lead to disparate impact, in the form of a veterans’ prefer-
ence statute that “operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of 
males.”24 The Court upheld the preference, noting that, “ ‘Discrimina-
tory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences.”25 Thus, although “it cannot seriously be 
argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts could have been una-
ware that most veterans are men,” there was no equal protection 
violation because there was no evidence of legislative intent to dis-
criminate against women.26 
 The Court has evidenced somewhat more flexibility in its ap-
proach under two circumstances. First, the Court is more likely to 
grant relief when the state action in question is more akin to state 
inaction that perpetuates a pre-existing system of inequality. Thus, 
where school districts pursue policies that result in continued school 
segregation (as distinct from desegregation), the Court has indicated, 
“actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are 
relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose.”27 
Similarly, where a county seeks to maintain an at-large electoral 
system in a district that dilutes the black vote, the Court has found 
that “discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence.”28  
 Second, the Court may grant relief when “the statistical dispari-
ties . . . warrant and require a conclusion that [is] irresistible, tanta-
mount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration 
that the State acted with a discriminatory purpose.”29 To date, the 
Court has only found statistical disparities that rose to this level 
twice. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, every single white applicant for a per-
mit to operate a laundry in a wooden building was granted one, and 
                                                                                                                  
 23. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 24. Id. at 259. 
 25. Id. at 279. 
 26. Id. at 278. 
 27. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979). 
 28. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); see also id. at 624 (noting district court 
findings of past discrimination against African Americans, historical exclusion of African 
Americans from the political process, and depressed socio-economic status of African Amer-
icans in the county). 
 29. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 n.12 (1987) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 293 (noting that an exception to the general rule 
that statistical evidence of disparate impact is insufficient may also exist in the “selection 
of the jury venire in a particular district,” where a “stark pattern” of disparity may suffice 
“as the sole proof of discriminatory intent” (quotation marks omitted)). 




not one of over two hundred Chinese applicants was granted one.30 In 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the state had altered the boundaries of a  
city from a square to “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that 
excluded 395 of 400 black voters and not a single white voter.31 Both 
of these cases pre-date Washington v. Davis; Yick Wo is more than a  
century old. 
The Court’s limited flexibility is thus of small comfort to plaintiffs 
who wish to challenge new state action or those who cannot show the 
stark statistical disparity the Court envisions. In the wake of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, legislators have reacted predictably: they “do 
not make a practice of justifying legislation on the grounds that it 
will adversely affect groups that have historically been subject to 
discrimination.”32 The Court has in turn acknowledged the difficulty 
it has created, noting that “[p]roving the motivation behind official 
action is often a problematic undertaking.”33  
 This combination of the Court’s jurisprudence and increased sav-
viness on the part of state actors has proven nearly fatal for plaintiffs 
seeking relief on the basis of racially disparate impact. The Court has 
been unwilling to find discriminatory intent in claims as wide-
ranging as those involving disparate application of the death penal-
ty,34 juror selection,35 and a road closure that disproportionately af-
fected African-American members of a community.36 
B.   Moving Beyond the Equal Protection Clause 
 This Article will not rehash the already familiar criticisms of the 
Court’s various holdings in the area of disparate impact. Suffice it to 
say that the shortcomings of a doctrine requiring proof of discrimina-
tory intent are nearly self-evident.37 Nor will it delve into the myriad 
                                                                                                                  
 30. 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886). 
 31. 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960). 
 32. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135-36 (1997) (“[D]octrines of 
heightened scrutiny have created incentives for legislators to explain their policy choices in 
terms that cannot be so impugned.”). 
 33. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). 
 34. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (rejecting equal protection claim based on racially 
disparate application of the death penalty). 
 35. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (deciding to remove 
Spanish-speaking jurors on the grounds that they would not consider only the court inter-
preter’s version of testimony did not violate equal protection). 
 36. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (1981). 
 37. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 32, at 1136 (“[T]he discriminatory purpose require-
ment now insulates many, if not most, forms of facially neutral state action from equal 
protection challenge.”); see also Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
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criticisms of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence or sugges-
tions for reform of the doctrine governing disparate impact.38 
 The dismay created by Davis and its progeny stems largely from 
three observations about race in America, each of which is empirical-
ly verifiable: first, that African Americans are disproportionately 
affected by laws that burden the poor or the socially disadvantaged, 
because they are disproportionately poor and socially disadvan-
taged;39 second, that most of the racism that remains in America is of 
the subconscious variety, as opposed to the explicit state-driven Jim 
Crow variety;40 and third, that racial inequalities (in a purely numer-
                                                                                                                  
CRIM. L. 7, 19 (2011) (“The Court has, as a practical matter, closed the door to claims of 
racial bias in the criminal justice system. It has immunized the new caste system from 
judicial scrutiny for racial bias, much as it once rallied to legitimate and protect slavery 
and Jim Crow.”); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal 
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (2011) (“[T]he Court has largely ignored 
the history of the moment that produced the Reconstruction Amendments and created a 
framework for equal protection analysis that all but ensures only a narrow group of dis-
crimination claims will be actionable or succeed.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 
1976 Term–Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 51 (1977) (“A legislature oblivious to [the] existing stigma of caste will nonetheless 
reinforce the stigma when it produces racially discriminatory effects through ostensibly 
‘neutral’ legislation.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (describing criti-
cisms of Davis as falling into two categories, those who object to the motive requirement 
and those who argue that racial inequality exists regardless of motive). 
 38. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 37, at 324 (proposing new “test to trigger judicial 
recognition of race-based behavior”); see also Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: 
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
953, 960 (1993) (proposing requirement that government justify all facially neutral decision 
making criteria that have disparate effects); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 491 (2004) (proposing single standard of review for Equal Protection 
claims); Karst, supra note 37, at 52 n.287 (proposing that government take into account 
principle of equal citizenship and justify racially disproportionate results); Larry G. Simon, 
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban 
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1111 (1978) (arguing govern-
ment should have to produce credible explanations when confronted with disparate im-
pact); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
935, 956 (1989) (proposing rigorous application of intent requirement, as requiring gov-
ernment to act as if it does not know the race of those affected by the decision). 
 39. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrim-
ination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 557 (1977). 
 40. There is a whole body of literature, both in legal commentary and in scientific 
studies, that identifies and explores the phenomenon of unconscious racism. See, e.g., Law-
rence, supra note 37, at 336-44 (discussing unconscious racism and citing studies); see also 
IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION 19-44, 165-314 (2001) (gathering evidence of disparate treatment in the 
retail sales of new cars, disparate impact in access to kidney transplantation, and the 
setting of bail rates); Flagg, supra note 38, at 983-85 (gathering studies indicating uncon-
scious racial bias in employment, mortgage lending, retail bargaining, psychiatric diagno-
ses, and other settings); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cogni-
tive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1161 (1995) (discussing unconscious bias in the context of Title VII). A number 
of scholars have concluded that the Court’s disregard for this research has resulted in a 
 




ical sense of the word “inequality”) persist in America regardless of 
why anyone thinks this may be the case.41 Much has been written 
about whether these inequalities constitute inequity, that is, whether 
they reflect structural or institutional racism, but that conversation 
is beyond the scope of this Article.42 
 Neither does this Article engage with the question of what should 
replace the current antidiscrimination framework.43 Some have an-
swered this question in a purely normative way, with various pro-
posals for the Court to modify or discard pieces of its equal protection 
jurisprudence.44 Others have answered this question more descrip-
tively, advocating a particular approach (such as a move to liberty-
                                                                                                                  
doctrine “that does not reflect prevailing understandings of the ways in which racial or 
gender bias operates.” Siegel, supra note 32, at 1138; cf. Richard Delgado, Centennial Re-
flections on the California Law Review’s Scholarship on Race: The Structure of Civil Rights 
Thought, 100 CAL. L. REV. 431, 440-41 (2012) (noting the difference between the paradigm 
of racial liberalism, which believes that racism is not dead and that discrimination can 
take many forms, and that of racial conservatism). Much has also been made of the Implic-
it Association Test, which purports to identify and quantify implicit bias, or unconscious 
racism. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html (last 
visited June 29, 2014). See, e.g., Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disin-
fection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 827 (2012) (discussing unconscious 
racism in context of jury selection); see also Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among 
Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1235 (2007) (concluding that implicit bias in physicians influ-
ences treatment decisions); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit 
Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 966 (2006) (concluding that “implicit race 
bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against African Americans” that 
results in disparate impact); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1124, 1126-27 (2012) (applying science of implicit bias to the courtroom). The premise 
of this Article does not depend upon the existence or extent of unconscious racism; it mere-
ly depends upon the existence and extent of racial inequality. 
 41. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1 & III.C.1.   
 42. See William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An 
Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2012) (“Because of its invisibility, structural racism does 
its work in the Potemkin village of ‘race-neutral’ policies.”); cf. KWAME TURE & CHARLES V. 
HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (Vintage Books 
1992) (1967) (“Racism is both overt and covert.”); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: 
Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 
(2000) (building “a theory of racism that explains organizational activity that systematical-
ly harms minority groups even though the decision-making individuals lack any conscious 
discriminatory intent”). 
 43. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1084-85 (arguing Washington v. 
Davis should be overturned).   
 44. See id. at 1075; see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and 
the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of 
Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 427 (2002) (examining the Equal Protection 
Clause and Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the lens of morality); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation 
with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (2005) (arguing that 
the Equal Protection Clause reflects a commitment to a “new substantive value of ‘non-
slavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery and white supremacy”). 
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based claims) and supporting that position with the legal strategies 
adopted in some cases.45  
 This Article’s contention is that reformers on the ground have al-
ready replaced the current antidiscrimination framework. They have 
done so deliberately and steadily over the last several decades, and 
they have done so with great success. It contends, moreover, that this 
success is attributable to the fact that reformers no longer overtly 
identify or describe their work as being explicitly concerned with an-
tidiscrimination, or at least not in their legal pleadings. Reformers 
have absorbed both the Court’s and the culture’s discomfort with ex-
plicitly race-based claims and have turned instead to combating racial 
inequality using a different framework and vocabulary altogether.46  
 1.   The Interplay of Liberty and Equality-Based Claims 
 The complementary nature of liberty and equality-based claims 
has long been noted.47 Using Lawrence v. Texas as a focal point, Law-
rence Tribe described the relationship between these two families of 
claims with customary aplomb: he speaks of “a narrative in which 
due process and equal protection, far from having separate missions 
and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal 
double helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increas-
ingly universal dignity.”48 Lawrence, in Tribe’s view, is a case that 
“presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and rela-
tionally situated theory of substantive liberty.”49 
 This Part identifies three overlapping strands in the recent schol-
arship on liberty- and equality-based claims. The first focuses on a 
                                                                                                                  
 45. See infra Part II.B.1.  
 46. In one of the few empirical studies conducted on disparate impact racial discrimi-
nation claims, Theodore Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson express surprise at how  
few such claims are filed.  They state: “The Supreme Court’s standard takes its toll not 
through an unusually high loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by 
deterring victims from even filing claims.” Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The 
Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1153 
(1991). Although this Article focuses largely upon systemic reform cases rather than indi-
vidual claims, its contention is that rather than being deterred from filing claims at all, 
victims of this type of racial discrimination have simply found alternatives to the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal 
Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2000) (“The Due Process Clause secures libertari-
an protections at the retail (individual) level that are important when the group is socially 
despised, while the Equal Protection Clause potentially offers minorities wholesale (group) 
level protection when (or if) the Court recognizes their legitimacy as partners in American 
pluralist democracy.”). 
 48. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). 
 49. Id. 




perceived shift in the Court’s jurisprudence driven by a desire to 
avoid inter-group conflict in an increasingly diverse society. The sec-
ond describes and advocates in favor of one type of claim as opposed 
to the other. And the third, “realist” position, takes the position that 
courts and reformers should simply use whichever claim fits best. 
 In the first group are Reva Siegel, Kenji Yoshino, and Rebecca 
Brown. Each of these scholars provides a psychological profile of sorts 
on the Court. Siegel identifies an antibalkanization perspective on 
the Court, which is concerned about threats to social cohesion.50 She 
contends that moderates on the Court who hold this perspective are 
willing to: 
allow government to engage in race-conscious efforts to integrate, 
providing that government proceeds in ways that lower the sali-
ence of race in its interactions with the public. Antibalkaniza-
tion . . . is distinctively concerned about the appearance of race-
conscious interventions – the risk that race-conscious civil rights 
interventions will heighten conflict or resentment.51 
 Where Siegel refers to an antibalkanization perspective, primarily 
in the context of race-based decision making, Yoshino identifies “plu-
ralism anxiety” as being responsible for a larger shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence “away from traditional group-based identity politics in 
its equal protection and free exercise jurisprudence.”52 He explores a 
more general narrative in which equality-based claims writ large (as 
opposed to liberty-based claims) make the Court nervous, because 
they force the Court to pick favorites among groups; “[l]iberty claims, 
in contrast, emphasize what all Americans . . . have in common.”53  
 Brown also alludes to the problem of “representation of an increas-
ingly heterogeneous population for which there can be no serious 
contention that the interest of some is necessarily the interest of 
all.”54 Instead of an antibalkanization perspective or pluralism anxie-
ty, Brown discusses “the strain of difference:”  
[T]he shared sense of values does not exist for everything that all 
people value. Nor does it exist for the increasing, yet still small, 
number who may wish to enjoy common freedoms, but in ways 
                                                                                                                  
 50. Siegel, supra note 10, at 1278. 
 51. Id. at 1357. 
 52. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 755. 
 53. Id. at 796. 
 54. Brown, supra note 11, at 1528. 
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that can be understood as distinguishable from the manner in 
which the many enjoy them.55 
 Yoshino and Brown both also participate in the second strand of 
the conversation, describing and advocating a shift towards liberty-
based claims. Yoshino observes that the Court has restricted equali-
ty-based claims but opened another avenue for relief, using “liberty 
analysis to mitigate its curtailment of group-based equality analy-
sis.”56 Brown also urges a new look at liberty claims, but her analysis 
is grounded in an understanding of equality as having already been 
largely attained: “As equality was to the last century, so should liber-
ty be to the next. Equality jurisprudence, after all, has achieved the 
stunning accomplishment of reconciling a robust judicial enforcement 
with the demands of democratic constitutional theory.”57 As Brown 
and others58 tell the story, equality claims have largely succeeded 
while liberty claims have foundered.59  
 Others, such as William Eskridge, would respond that equality-
based claims fill a role that liberty-based claims cannot, because they 
can provide relief for an entire group at a time:  
[R]egular equal protection and due process scrutiny might be ei-
ther interchangeable or interdependent at the retail level, that is, 
in challenges to particular discriminations, especially penalty-
based ones. But the Equal Protection Clause alone offers a minori-
ty group a potential constitutional jackpot at the wholesale level, 
that is, in challenges to an array of interconnected discriminations 
in state benefits as well as burdens.60 
 Finally, some scholars take the approach closest to the hearts of 
litigation-minded reformers: the best type of claim is that which fits 
your agenda. Richard Delgado, for example, states:  
[A]ttention to human needs, problems, deprivation, and flourishing 
may proceed under one of two banners, individual rights or equal 
                                                                                                                  
 55. Id. at 1531; see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local 
Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 908-09 (2011) (“Equality norms can be framed and vindicated in a 
more palatable, legally tenable form, and tied to other interests to appeal more widely and 
ameliorate estrangement in a polarized polity.”). 
 56. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 776. 
 57. Brown, supra note 11, at 1492. 
 58. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review Is as Legitimate as Equality 
Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3-4 (2011) (identi-
fying the roots of the liberty/equality binary as a “legitimacy disparity” between the two, 
wherein judicial review founded on equality principles is lauded, as in the case of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but review founded on liberty principles is sus-
pect, as in the case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 59. Brown, supra note 11, at 1494. 
 60. Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1216.   




protection. Both approaches aim at the same goal, both result in 
heightened judicial scrutiny, and the choice to proceed under one 
banner or the other is largely a matter of tactics, ideological com-
mitment, or perceived public sentiment.61 
 Each of these scholars has contributed invaluable and ground-
breaking insight on the dynamic interplay between liberty and equal-
ity claims, and each offers a unique and valuable perspective on re-
cent developments in that dynamic. Siegel provides a pinpoint identi-
fication of the problem that reformers concerned with racial equality 
confront, not just before the Supreme Court, but also in lower courts 
and in the court of public opinion: race continues to matter, but state 
actors (like school administrators) must pretend it does not. Yoshino 
and Brown provide a compelling description of the shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence away from equality-based claims. Delgado’s work reso-
nates with reformers on the ground who will gladly adopt any claim 
that serves their purposes. And Eskridge offers us a powerful re-
minder that structural problems demand structural solutions—
solutions that are wholesale, not retail.  
 To this important body of literature, this Article offers several 
insights. First, critical work remains to be done, even when it comes 
to the most basic of equalities. Second, there is a rich world beyond 
the binary of liberty- and equality-based claims to help tackle that 
work. And third, reformers on the ground are already making use of 
a multitude of strategies to address racial disparity. 
 2.   Moving Beyond Liberty/Equality to Achieve Equal Protection 
 This Article urges a return to the conversation about claims for 
racial equality, which remain salient in the national discourse but 
often are no longer identified as such by their proponents. The incli-
nation to move beyond race is visible on several fronts: in society, in 
the Court’s decisions, and within the academy. Thus, the debate over 
affirmative action is at once avoidant of race and yet indelibly 
stamped by it, taking place against the backdrop of a Court and soci-
ety that increasingly seems to believe—rightly or wrongly—that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop dis-
criminating on the basis of race.”62 Most contemporary academic 
                                                                                                                  
 61. Delgado, supra note 40, at 450. 
 62. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007); c.f. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1064 (“Substantive racial equality 
clearly mattered to the Court once.”). 
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commentary on equal protection has, in turn, moved away from race 
and towards gay rights and same-sex marriage in particular.63  
 This Article contends that the discussion about equal protection is 
a richer one when informed by the traditional, racial underpinnings 
of the Equal Protection Clause. We must be careful, both as a society 
and an academy, not to be too quick to leave race behind. From a 
purely empirical perspective, race indisputably still matters.64 But 
even more importantly, the scope of protection afforded under the 
Equal Protection Clause should matter not just to the old groups al-
ready under its ambit, but also to new groups seeking to join. Mem-
bership in the club might be less valuable if the benefits are not as 
extensive as one had assumed. 
 A return to the academic and social conversation about racial 
equality is not the same as a return to explicitly race-based claims in 
litigation; indeed, the primary descriptive insight this Article con-
tributes is that such claims are largely doomed to fail.65 But this re-
fusal to revisit a doctrinal dead-end from a litigation standpoint is 
not an endorsement of a “post-racial” society.66 Kimberlé Williams 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Marriage This Term: On Liberty and the “New Equal 
Protection”, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 6 (2012) (arguing the LGB movement should 
continue to root its claims in equality, as opposed to liberty); Yoshino, supra note 9, at 778 
(centering his claim that equality-based claims are giving way to liberty-based claims by 
citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)). Not coincidentally, gay marriage is on 
the Court’s mind as well. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking 
down the Defense of Marriage Act); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(holding proponents of California’s Proposition 8 did not have standing to appeal district 
court’s order finding the proposition unconstitutional). 
 64. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Racial inequality is unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon, and the sordid history of race in America will likely continue to 
manifest itself in differentiation between legislation with racial impact and legislation with 
impact on minorities of other types. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism 
in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1303 (1982) (“In contrast to the deep 
societal roots of governmental action against Blacks—the close fit between private terror, 
public discrimination, and political exclusion, directed against Blacks for a century—action 
against other minorities has usually been sporadic, transitory, and local.”); see also id. at 
1308 (“[T]he apparently neutral structural characteristics of the Constitution had never 
been neutral concerning race.”). Further, although the Court’s holdings have adversely 
affected the ability of other groups to bring disparate impact claims, such as those based 
upon gender inequalities, nowhere has the effect been greater than on claims involving 
racial disparity. 
 65. Cf. Barnes et al., supra note 5, at 1000 (urging a change in “the way in which 
equality advocates frame the discussion” to “shift the underlying premise of equality argu-
ments from a compensatory to a distributive justice rationale”); Fan, supra note 55, at 909 
(arguing that “alternate approaches [to equality-based claims] must enfold antidiscrimina-
tion concerns and norms into the analysis rather than altogether elide address of the con-
cerns”). This Article contends that successful reformers have avoided this strategy because 
it would defeat the purpose. They have, in other words, already reframed the discussion, 
and the new frame has nothing whatsoever to do with racial equality.   
 66. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1313-46 (describing and critiquing the phenome-
non of post-racialism). 




Crenshaw offers a powerful critique of the strategies described herein 
in a variation of the adage: “The master’s tools will never dismantle 
the master’s house.”67 Crenshaw criticizes not just the concept of 
post-racialism, the idea that race no longer matters in our society, 
but also the “post-racial pragmatism . . . that urges scaling racial 
obstacles while declining to name them.”68 She argues that such 
pragmatism entraps racial justice advocates and constituencies; si-
lences racial justice advocacy; threatens to make the racial dispari-
ties described in this Article “unremarkable features of the post-
racial world;” and renders civil rights advocates “yesterday’s news—
irrelevant, delusional and unsophisticated.”69 
 In a similar vein, Michelle Alexander thoroughly documents the 
racial disparity in America’s mass incarceration, which she describes 
as “the New Jim Crow.”70 Alexander criticizes the reform response to 
this phenomenon on several fronts: for being insufficient in scale and 
scope; focusing overly on litigation instead of grassroots reform; and 
considering race-neutral grounds for reform.71 Specifically, Alexander 
argues, “The prevailing caste system cannot be successfully disman-
tled with a purely race-neutral approach.”72 She notes that “opportu-
nities for challenging mass incarceration on purely race-neutral 
grounds have never been greater,” but urges racial justice advocates 
not to take the “tempting bait.”73 
 This Article’s response to these powerful and persuasive criticisms 
is grounded more in realpolitik than ideology. While Alexander is 
undoubtedly correct that racial inequality will not be eradicated with 
any single lawsuit or legal strategy, litigation will continue to play an 
important role and litigators must take notice of doctrinal reality. 
Rather than cede the notion of the “reigned in” and narrowed “field of 
contestation” that Crenshaw depicts, reformers have broadened the 
legal grounds on which to fight.74 They would surely agree that “there 
                                                                                                                  
 67. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (rev. ed. 2007).  
 68. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1332. 
 69. Id. at 1327-1340. Reformers may find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard 
place in the academic commentary. Richard Thompson Ford criticizes those who perhaps 
belong to an older school for which Crenshaw may feel nostalgia. See RICHARD THOMPSON 
FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 24-25, 27 
(2011) (“Civil rights have effectively ‘occupied the field’ of social justice, crowding out alter-
native ways of thinking and new solutions. . . . The civil rights tradition encourages us to 
look at disputes through a lens that is designed to focus on discrimination.”). 
 70. ALEXANDER, supra note 2. 
 71. Id. at 225-39. 
 72. Id. at 239. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1343. 
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are limits to the degree that racial justice can be finessed,”75 but the 
fight for racial justice is not over, and the advocates who continue to 
wage the fight are far from irrelevant, delusional, or unsophisticated 
in their tactics. For example, they are engaged in active battles over 
the school-to-prison pipeline and the disproportionate impact of the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis—two of the areas of racial disparity 
Crenshaw worries will become “unremarkable features of the post-
racial world.”76  
 Civil rights advocates do not have the luxury of ignoring equal 
protection doctrine post-Washington v. Davis, which has essentially 
reified the concept of post-racialism in the courtroom; but neither 
have they walked away from the challenge.77  
III.   THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE 
 This Part begins the descriptive project of identifying and analyz-
ing the ways in which reformers have begun to combat racial inequal-
ity without resort to the Equal Protection Clause.78 I have identified 
three main areas in which they have done so, each of which serves to 
illuminate two larger groups of claims, one having to do with the na-
ture of the right being vindicated and the other having to do with the 
nature of the disproportionate impact. The claims range from those 
rooted in the specific enumerations of the Bill of Rights to those that 
stem from the federalist structure of our legal system. The nature of 
the disproportionate impact addressed by these claims is similarly 
wide-ranging, from that which is caused with no explicit racial ani-
                                                                                                                  
 75. Id. at 1346. 
 76. Id. at 1337-40. 
 77. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The civil rights movement has a long history of pragmatism, 
dating back to Plessy v. Ferguson, which was brought as a test case by reformers who pre-
sented the Court with a plaintiff who was seven-eighths white. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896); see also, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (bring-
ing gender discrimination claim on behalf of men); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
681-82 (1973) (same).  
 78. Others have written about circumventing the intent requirement to vindicate 
racial inequality, most notably in the area of environmental law. See, e.g., Julie H. Hurwitz 
& E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental Racism: From 
Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval, 2 J.L. SOC’Y 5, 9-10 (2001); Suzanne Smith, 
Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the 
Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 249-50 (2002) (discussing administrative proceed-
ings and private rights of action under section 602 of Title VI as possible alternatives to 
using the Equal Protection Clause to seek redress); Sandra L. Geiger, An Alternative Legal 
Tool for Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 201, 204 (1998); see also, e.g., Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered 
Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (1992) (discussing statutory alternative 
to equal protection challenges on behalf of battered women); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution 
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) (dis-
cussing equal protection challenges to racially biased decisions to prosecute). 




mus, to that which nears explicit racial bias, but falls short of the 
Supreme Court’s definition of discriminatory intent. 
 The first group of claims in Part III.A, indigent defense reform, 
represents not only those claims that implicate other explicitly enu-
merated constitutional rights, such as ones involving the criminal 
justice system and criminal procedure, but also claims in which any 
other enumerated constitutional right (other than equal protection) is 
at stake. These cases also serve to inform a discussion of dispropor-
tionate impact that stems purely from the economics of poverty, with 
no evidence of explicit animus. 
 The second constellation of claims in Part III.B, having to do with 
efforts to redress the school-to-prison pipeline, stand in for claims 
implicating statutory as opposed to constitutional rights, and claims 
in which the source of the disproportionate impact is perhaps less 
clear. These are claims for which the Equal Protection Clause might 
have held some promise in the absence of a discriminatory intent 
requirement, that is, where there is ample statistical evidence of ra-
cial disparity in treatment and perhaps some evidence of intent, but 
not enough to meet the requirements laid out in Arlington Heights. 
 Finally, Part III.C turns to immigration-related claims, challenges 
to state and local regulations directed at undocumented workers, or 
so-called “illegal immigrants.” This group of claims represents struc-
tural interests beyond enumerated individual rights, such as the 
separation of powers. This group of claims also involves dispropor-
tionate impact in which racial animus likely plays a role but falls 
short of the explicit discriminatory intent the Court demands. 
A.   Indigent Defense Reform, Other Constitutional Rights, and Purely 
Disproportionate Impact 
 The problems that plague the state public-defense systems in this 
country are not new; much has been written to catalog them and this 
Article will take them as a given.79 This Part uses public defense re-
form as a lens through which to view a particular type of racial jus-
tice claim: those that implicate criminal procedure, or more broadly, 
                                                                                                                  
 79. See, e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 
12-24 (2011), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_scl 
aid_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads_supplement.pdf; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., 
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 49-101 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf; Emily 
Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for Adjudicating Pre-
Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 447-50 & 
nn.20-39 (2010).  
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those for which a constitutional guarantee other than equal protec-
tion applies. This analysis is also intended to shed light on the fight 
against other similar problems that attend our criminal justice sys-
tem as a whole. 
 1.   The Disparate Impact 
 Although problems with state public defense systems do not solely 
affect people of color—and in some jurisdictions may not even pri-
marily affect people of color—the effects of poorly functioning sys-
tems across the U.S. are disproportionately borne by people of  
color. First, problems with public defense systems are by definition 
borne by the poor, and greater percentages of African Americans  
and Hispanics live below the poverty line than do whites.80 Second, 
all aspects of the criminal justice system disproportionately affect 
people of color and African-American men in particular.81 Finally, 
statistical evidence indicates that a higher percentage of incarcerated 
African Americans and Hispanics had publicly appointed counsel 
than whites.82 
 This Part will assume that there is generally no evidence of racial 
animus in state and local government decisions to underfund or  
otherwise neglect their public defense systems, and certainly no  
evidence of discriminatory intent that rises to the level required  
by Arlington Heights. In other words, traditional equal protection  
                                                                                                                  
 80. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 4, at 8-9. In 2011, the percentages of those 
below the poverty line were 9.8% for non-Hispanic whites, 27.6% for blacks, and 25.3% for 
Hispanics. Id. at 14. 
 81. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in Afri-
can American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (2004) (discussing the “com-
munity-level harms” that flow from “grossly disproportionate” rates of incarceration of 
African-American men); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug 
and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (2008) (surveying 
the empirical literature on the disproportionate burdens facing people of color in arrests, 
conviction, and sentencing, concluding that “political and ideological exigencies of the last 
quarter century have conduced to the adoption of crime control policies of unprecedented 
severity, the primary burdens of which have been borne by disadvantaged blacks (and, 
increasingly, Hispanics)”); Katherine J. Rosich, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice 
System, AM. SOC. ASS’N  2-3 (Sept. 2007), http://www.asanet.org/images/press/docs/pdf/ 
ASARaceCrime.pdf (surveying social science research on race and crime and identifying 
numerous areas of racial disparity); see also Alexander, supra note 37, at 18-19 (“Law 
enforcement officials are largely free to discriminate on the basis of race today, so long as 
no one admits it. That’s the key.”). 
 82. “While 69% of white state prison inmates reported they had lawyers appointed by 
the court, 77% of blacks and 73% of Hispanics had publicly financed attorneys.  In federal 
prison black inmates were more likely than whites and Hispanics to have public counsel: 
65% for blacks, 57% for whites and 56% for Hispanics.” Indigent Defense Systems, BUREAU 
OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=28#defendants (last visited 
June 29, 2014); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEFENSE COUNSEL 
IN CRIMINAL CASES 9 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf. 




claims to challenge this particular type of state action (or inaction)  
are foreclosed.  
 2.   The Reform Response 
 Despite the lack of availability of traditional equal protection 
claims, indigent defense reform has been a veritable hotbed of  
litigation and other activity over the last decade, and a number of the  
lawsuits have been filed by organizations explicitly dedicated to ra-
cial justice.83 For many, the connection between the pursuit of indi-
gent defense reform and racial justice is explicit: “[T]he dispropor-
                                                                                                                  
 83. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Mich. 2010), vacated, 790 N.W.2d 
695 (2010) (alleging indigent criminal defendants are being denied their right to counsel 
and “effective assistance of counsel,” filed by the ACLU’s Racial Justice Project); White v. 
Martz, No. CDV-2002-133, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136, at *1 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 
2006) (alleging public defender programs in Montana counties lack the resources to provide 
statutorily and constitutionally adequate representation of indigent clients, filed by the 
ACLU’s Racial Justice Project); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 232 (N.Y. 2010) 
(alleging a claim for ineffective counsel of indigent criminal defendants, filed by the New 
York Civil Liberties Union); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Richmond v. Dist. Court of Md., No. 24-C-06-009911 
CN, 2007 WL 5446238 (Cir. Crt. Md. Dec. 7, 2007); see also SARAH GERAGHTY & MIRIAM 
GOHARA, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 6-8 (2003), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/download 
s/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms_assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf. The Brennan Center 
for Justice at NYU School of Law has also identified indigent defense reform as a focus 
within the area of “racial justice.” Racial Justice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/racial_justice/ (last visited June 29, 
2014); see also Brief for Brennan Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, De-
Wolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN), 2011 WL 4585691; 
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Appellees, DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN), 
2011 WL 4585691; Brief for Brennan Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, 
Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) (No. 07-242-CZ), 2011 WL 4585691; Brief for 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellees, Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) (No. 07-242-CZ), 2011 WL 4585691; 
Brief of Former Prosecutors Michael A. Battle et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-0066), 2010 WL 
1775135. In a 2008 report, the Brennan Center discussed guidelines to determine eligibil-
ity for publicly appointed counsel. DAVID UDELL ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ELIGIBLE 
FOR JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTING DEFENSE COUNSEL 5-26 (2008), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Eligibility.Report.pdf; see 
also THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., GIDEON AT 50: THREE 
REFORMS TO REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 8-9 (2013), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_040913.pdf. The 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice at Harvard Law School has a pro-
ject entitled “MyGideon,” designed to provide resources to indigent and capital defense 
attorneys. MyGideon, THE CHARLES HAMILTON HOUS. INST. FOR RACE & JUST., HARV. L. 
SCH. (July 26, 2012), http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/portfolio/my-gideon/; see also 
Catherine V. Beane, Indigent Defense: Separate and Unequal, CHAMPION, May 2004, at 54, 
55 (“NACDL’s Indigent Defense Committee welcomes your suggestions on ways that we 
can better address racial justice issues and the disproportionate impact that inadequate 
indigent defense has on communities of color.”). 
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tionate presence of racial minorities among the indigents relying  
on public defender services reinforces the need to ensure that all de-
fendants receive competent representation, else the criminal justice 
system will create further disparities in treatment of persons of  
different races.”84  
 And yet no mention of racial justice is made in the reform work 
itself; the legal documents filed rely almost exclusively upon the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment. This Part will focus upon  
some of the most recent developments in this area and highlight the 
successes reformers have had in a variety of cases with different  
procedural postures.85 
 First, advocates have continued to file classic class action suits 
that seek wholesale reform at the state or county level. Litigation  
of this type builds upon successes like the statewide public defense 
system implemented by Montana in response to an ACLU lawsuit.86 
These claims typically request injunctive and declaratory relief on 
behalf of a class of indigent criminal defendants, alleging that the 
public defense systems in question are inadequately resourced  
and supervised.87 
 Litigation seeking state-wide reform was most recently successful 
in Michigan, where a suit filed by the ACLU in 2006 resulted in pas-
sage of a bill that created a public defense commission tasked with 
collecting data and implementing standards.88 Similar litigation is 
                                                                                                                  
 84. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Centu-
ry, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 93 (1995).  
 85. The increase in litigation and other reform activity in this area has been so vast 
that this Article will not even attempt a comprehensive review.  There have been a number 
of non-litigation successes as well, however, and they too have not resorted to explicit 
claims of racial injustice. See, e.g., Order, In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning 
Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases (Nev. 
2008) (ADKT No. 411) (implementing comprehensive performance standards); H.R. 483, 
51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013) (creating independent public defense commission in New 
Mexico); H.R. 147, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (establishing presumptive indigen-
cy guidelines in Idaho); H.R. 148, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (prohibiting attor-
neys from serving as both lawyer and guardian ad litem for children); H.R. 149, 62d Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (preventing juveniles from making uninformed waivers of coun-
sel); Texas Fair Defense Act, S.B. 7, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 
1800-01 (codified as amended at TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (West 2004)) 
(providing for state funding, requiring minimum standards in counties, guaranteeing 
access to necessary and sufficient support services for attorneys, and creating centralized 
data collection system in Texas). 
 86. White, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136, at *5.  
 87. Amended Complaint at 5, White v. Martz, No. CDV-2002-133, 2006 Mont. Dist. 
LEXIS 136 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002). 
 88. Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 53. 
The author worked on this litigation while at the Brennan Center for Justice, and subse-
quently at the ACLU. 




still pending in New York.89 Advocates filed suit in Georgia90 and en-
tered into a consent decree that revised the procedures for respond-
ing to requests for conflict-free appellate counsel, provided for addi-
tional full-time staff attorneys and workload controls for the appel-
late division of the public defender office, monitoring of contract at-
torneys working for the appellate division, and data collection.91 
County or municipality-based lawsuits are pending in Washington,92 
Texas,93 Georgia,94 and Pennsylvania.95 Not one of these lawsuits in-
cludes a federal equal protection claim.  
 Second, some public defenders have successfully brought suits 
themselves, seeking to limit their own caseloads. These cases have a 
more mixed record than the prototypical class actions described 
above and some have yet to play out fully, but they remain a type of 
claim tethered to the Sixth Amendment that reformers may consid-
er.96 The Florida Supreme Court recently found in favor of the Miami-
Dade County Public Defender’s Office’s right to move to decline ap-
pointment in future cases due to excessive caseloads.97 Similarly, a 
suit filed by the Public Defender of Mojave County, Arizona, resulted 
in a ruling that permitted the office to withdraw from thirty-nine 
cases, and warned the county that future motions to withdraw would 
also be granted “until the court is convinced that the reasons for do-
                                                                                                                  
 89. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367, 372 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 6 2011) 
(reversing lower court’s denial of class certification and granting class certification). 
 90. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declara-
tory Relief, Flournoy v. Georgia, No. 2009CV178947 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2009), 2009 
WL 8728189 (seeking relief on behalf of class represented by state public defenders office’s 
appellate division). 
 91. Consent Decree, Flournoy v. Georgia, No. 2009CV178947 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 
2012), 2012 WL 5885196. 
 92. Order Denying Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunction, Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 600727; see also Best v. Grant Cty., No. 04-2- 00189-0 (Su-
per. Ct. Wash. Aug. 26, 2004) . 
 93. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., No. 10-0671, slip op. at 2-3 (Tex. June 8, 2012) 
(seeking relief on behalf of class facing misdemeanor charges). 
 94. Verified Complaint at 4, 14, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M (Ga. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 7, 2009), 2009 WL 1043789 (seeking relief on behalf of class charged with felony of-
fenses in five counties in Georgia). 
 95. Class Action Complaint, Flora v. Luzerne Cty., No. 2072 CD 2013 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Apr. 10, 2012). 
 96. For a general discussion of this type of litigation and for specific information about 
these cases, see LEFSTEIN, supra note 79, at 161-90. 
 97. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla.  
2013) (noting the court is “reaffirm[ing] that aggregate/systemic motions to withdraw are  
appropriate in circumstances where there is an office-wide or wide-spread problem as to  
effective representation”). 
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ing so no longer exist.”98 But relief was denied to defenders seeking 
relief in New Orleans99 and Knoxville.100 And although the Missouri 
Public Defender Commission fought successfully for the right to limit 
the caseloads of its attorneys,101 a bill introduced in the 2013 legisla-
tive session sought to resolve the caseload problem by privatizing 
services for all non-serious felony cases through low-bid contracts.102  
 Claims brought by public defenders based explicitly upon a dis-
parate impact theory under the Equal Protection Clause have not 
met with success at all, however. In Idaho, for example, contract at-
torneys filed suit against a county for breach of contract when the 
county sought to terminate their contract. The attorneys included an 
equal protection claim, alleging that the county’s attempts to jettison 
its contract with them in favor of a low-bid contract would have a 
disproportionate impact on Idaho’s racial minorities because 20% of 
Idaho’s racial minorities and 25% of Idaho’s total Hispanic population 
reside in the county in question.103 Their claim was denied.104 
 Finally, advocates of improved public defense services have had 
notable success before the Supreme Court. The Court has continually 
expanded entitlement to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, re-
quiring in recent years, for example, the appointment of counsel at 
pretrial interrogations105 and in misdemeanor cases where there is a 
substantial likelihood of incarceration.106 The Court has also recently 
held that failure to communicate a plea offer to a defendant consti-
tutes deficient performance by counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
and that defendants may be prejudiced by counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance in recommending that a plea offer be rejected.107 Although 
none of these cases are systemic reform cases (each is a claim for 
post-conviction relief on behalf of a particular defendant); the last 
two cases, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, are not public de-
fense cases at all. Each will have a salutary effect on racial justice, as 
                                                                                                                  
 98. Arizona v. Lopez, No. CR-2007-1544, slip op. at 9-10 (Mohave Cnty. Sup. Ct.  
Dec. 17, 2007). 
 99. Loisiana v. Edwards, No. 2007-K-639 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007). 
 100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Pet. of Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender, No. 
174552-C (Tenn. Knox Cnty. Ch. Ct. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 101. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 887 (2009). 
 102. H.B. 215, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).  
 103. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *4, Wiebe & Fouser, P.A. v. 
Idaho, No. CV09-4413-C, 2009 WL 3072841 (Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 2009). 
 104. Wiebe & Fouser, P.A. v. Idaho, No. CV-2009-4413-C, 2009 WL 2980444, at *1 
(Dist. Ct. July 31, 2009). 
 105. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2009). 
 106. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). 
 107. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 
1408 (2012). 




reflected by a number of the amicus briefs submitted by various pub-
lic interest organizations.108 Again, however, nowhere is the Equal 
Protection Clause mentioned in the actual legal claims. 
 3.   Beyond Public Defense Reform—Lessons for Other Claims 
 Each of the success stories in public defense reform has made a 
real difference for the millions of people of color caught up in the 
criminal justice system, with nary a mention of racial justice or equal 
protection. Of the claims described in this Article, these are perhaps 
closest in temperament to the “liberty-based” claims Yoshino de-
scribes and prescribes, as they seek to vindicate a right (to counsel) 
functionally denied to some by relying on the universality of the 
right’s guarantee to all.  
 The Bill of Rights has held great promise for other areas in which 
notable racial disparity exists. For example, capital defense reform, a 
close cousin of public defense reform, has also benefited enormously 
from the tactics described above.109 The disparate racial impact of the 
death penalty is clear. The current death row population is 41% black 
and 43% white.110 Of the defendants executed in the United States 
since 1976, 35% were black and 56% were white.111 And infamously, 
the racial disparity when it comes to victims of crimes for which the 
death penalty was inflicted is even starker: 15% of the victims were 
black, compared to 77% who were white.112  
 Despite the racial disparity, perhaps nowhere are claims based on 
disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause more plainly 
foreclosed. The Supreme Court dealt explicitly with the issue in 
                                                                                                                  
 108. See, e.g., Brief for the Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents at 19, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209), Missouri v. Frye, 
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No. 10-444) (arguing the following as its second ground on appeal: 
“Because Indigent Defendants Plead Guilty At An Even Higher Rate Than Others, Peti-
tioners’ Proposed Standard For Prejudice Would Deprive Most Indigent Defendants Of Full 
Protection Under The Sixth Amendment”); Brief of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. 
Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209), Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No. 10-444). 
 109. Capital defense reform is understood to encompass an array of projects, including 
the following: elimination of the death penalty, whether wholesale or piecemeal;  
improvements in legal representation for those facing the death penalty, including the 
implementation of standards governing who may represent those facing capital charges; 
and direct representation. 
 110. Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976#defend (last visit-
ed June 29, 2014).   
 111. Id.   
 112. See id. Similarly, 19 white defendants were executed for murdering one or more 
black victims, while 257 black defendants were executed for murdering one or more  
white victims. Id.   
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McCleskey v. Kemp, finding that statistical evidence that the death 
penalty was imposed far more frequently on black defendants who 
killed white victims than on white defendants who killed black vic-
tims, even after for controlling for a number of other factors, was 
insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.113 The Court held that in order for McCleskey to prevail on 
his claim, he “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature en-
acted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an antici-
pated racially discriminatory effect.”114 Such evidence, of course, 
would be virtually impossible to come by.115 
 McCleskey also raised an Eighth Amendment issue. But in con-
trast to the use of rights other than those associated with equal pro-
tection that this Article advocates, his claim was doomed because it 
was premised on the same racial disparity he sought to address with 
the equal protection claim: he argued that the statistical evidence of 
racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty made the 
death penalty “cruel and unusual” as applied to him.116 The success-
ful strategies this Article explores are based instead on assertions of 
rights wholly independent of racial disparity challenges.  
 Death penalty abolitionists and racial justice advocates have suc-
ceeded in continually chipping away at the death penalty—and its 
attendant racial disparities—through the Eighth Amendment. In 
Atkins v. Virginia,117 the Court agreed that imposing the death penal-
ty upon the intellectually disabled constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment” for Eighth Amendment purposes.118 The Court premised 
its holding on “the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, 
and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological 
purposes served by the death penalty” and noted also that “some 
characteristics of mental retardation undermine the strength of the 
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly 
guards.”119 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, the 
United States executed forty-four defendants with intellectual disa-
                                                                                                                  
 113. 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987). 
 114. Id. at 298. 
 115. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (denying request for 
discovery in selective prosecution claim based on disparate racial impact between prosecu-
tions for crack cocaine and powder cocaine because respondents “failed to show that the 
Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races”). 
 116. McCleskey, 481 U.S. 297.  
 117. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 118. Id. at 321. 
 119. Id. at 317. 




bilities between 1984 and 2002.120 Thirty-two percent of those were 
white, 62% were black.121 
 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,122 the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids “imposition of the death penalty on offenders 
who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”123 
In so holding, the Court noted the diminished culpability of juveniles 
and stated “retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe 
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immatu-
rity.”124 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, as of the 
end of 2004 (when Simmons was decided) there were seventy-one 
people on death row for crimes committed as juveniles.125 Sixty-four 
percent were people of color;126 41% were black, and 34% were 
white.127 And, in a set of statistics that would be familiar to McCles-
key, 71% of the victims whose race was known were white and 28% 
were black.128 
 Reformers seeking to address racial disparity in public defense—
and the criminal justice system more generally—have found success 
pursuing claims under other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as long 
as those claims are founded in the “liberty” strand of doctrine de-
scribed above, premised on rights held by all rather than the denial 
of a right to some.129 Those who have made the greatest strides in 
                                                                                                                  
 120. List of Defendants with Mental Retardation Executed in the United States, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardation-
executed-united-states (last visited June 29, 2012) (citing Denis Keyes et al., People with 
Mental Retardation Are Dying, Legally: At Least 44 Have Been Executed, 40 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 243, 243-44 (2002)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 123. Id. at 578. 
 124. Id. at 571. 
 125. Juvenile Offenders Who Were on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvenile-offenders-who-were-death-row#streiboverview (last 
visited June 29, 2012) (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH 
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY, 1, 1973 - APRIL 31, 2004 (2004), 
available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/JuvDeathApril2004.pdf). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. This reform work does not even include the on-going effort on behalf of the wrong-
fully convicted to pursue exonerations largely on the basis of DNA evidence via state statu-
tory claims and federal and state habeas petitions. Poor lawyering at the trial level is 
frequently implicated. The Innocence Project, perhaps the most well-known of the organi-
zations pursuing exonerations on behalf of the wrongfully convicted, explicitly identifies 
“bad lawyering” as one of the six potential causes of wrongful convictions, The Causes of 
Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ 
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ensuring the provision of adequate counsel to the people of color most 
gravely affected by shortcomings in our indigent defense system and 
who have succeeded in protecting the most vulnerable from a death 
penalty system riddled with disparate impact, have done so without 
reference to race. There is every reason to believe that the reformers 
tackling the next frontiers in this type of claim, such as the problem 
of mass incarceration in our society, can and will do the same.130 
B.   School-to-Prison Pipeline, Statutory Claims, and Unconscious 
Bias  
 The “school-to-prison-pipeline”131 is a term used by advocates, 
scholars, and reformers to describe the phenomenon by which chil-
dren are funneled out of the educational system and into the criminal 
                                                                                                                  
(last visited June 29, 2014), and notes, “Improving resources for public defense and ensur-
ing the proper training and oversight of all defense lawyers can prevent wrongful convic-
tions.” William Fleener, Staff Att’y, Cooley Innocence Project, Testimony to the Indigent 
Defense Advisory Commission, MICH. CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Fleener%20Testimony%20to%20the%20Indi
gent%20Defense%20Advisory%20Commission%20final.doc; see also SAMUEL R. GROSS & 
MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1989–2012 42 (2012), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ 
Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (“For 104 exonerations, our infor-
mation includes clear evidence of severely inadequate legal defense, but we believe that 
many more of the exonerated defendants – perhaps a clear majority – would not have been 
convicted in the first instance if their lawyers had done good work.”). 
  And the racial disparity being addressed is undeniable. According to the National 
Registry of Exonerations, 1040 people had been exonerated as of the date of this Article. 
About the Registry, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited June 29, 2014). Of 802 crimes for which the race 
of the defendant was known, 50% of the exonerees were black and 38% were white. See 
GROSS, supra note 129, at 31 (noting “[i]t’s no surprise that black defendants are heavily 
overrepresented among exonerees: they are heavily overrepresented among those arrested 
and imprisoned for violent crimes and drug crimes. But the disproportions we see are 
greater than what one would expect.”). The racial disparities were even greater for sexual 
assault (63% black versus 32% white), attempted murder (59% black versus 12% white), 
robbery (64% black versus 18% white), and drug crimes (60% black versus 10% white). See id. 
 130. This is not to say that claims based upon the Equal Protection Clause or disparate 
impact are dead altogether. The recent challenges to the New York City Police Depart-
ment’s “stop and frisk” policies and practices, for example, combine classic liberty claims 
under the Fourth Amendment with equal protection (and an array of common law tort) 
claims. Complaint at 4, 48-49, Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS)), 2012 WL 1031760; Complaint at 2, 40, 42, 50, Davis v. City of 
New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)), 2010 WL 
9937605; Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
and Individual Damages at 2, 34, 36, 42, Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)); see also Opinion and Order at 6, Floyd v. City of 
New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)) (noting that 2.8 mil-
lion people were stopped between 2004 and 2009 and that over 52% of those stops were of 
blacks, 31% were of Latinos, and 10% were of whites). 
 131. This phenomenon is also sometimes referred to as “schoolhouse to the jailhouse.” 




justice system.132 The funneling effect of the pipeline can take place 
at any number of junctures within the education system and via any 
number of different administrative and educational policies and prac-
tices.133 Examples of the pipeline at work include overuse of the 
school disciplinary system (sometimes through zero tolerance poli-
cies) that results in students being kept out of school,134 and referrals 
to the criminal justice system for infractions traditionally handled  
by schools.135 
 1.   The Disparate Impact 
 The statistical evidence of the disparate impact the phenomenon 
has on children of color is wide-ranging.136 In 2009-2010, the national 
graduation rate for black male students was 52% and for Latino 
males it was 58%; in contrast, white males graduated at a rate of 
78%.137 A recent survey conducted by the Department of Education of 
72,000 schools (covering 85% of students nationwide) found that 
black students constitute 18% of the student body population, but 
35% of the students suspended at least once, 46% of those suspended 
more than once, and 39% of those expelled.138 In fact, black students 
                                                                                                                  
 132. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE 
TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 11 (2005). 
 133. See, e.g., Emily Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983 
Liability in the Context of Disciplinary Alternative Schools and Beyond, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 
615, 621-22 & nn.23-29 (2012) (describing facets of the pipeline and providing citations); 
Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 
TENN. L. REV. 265, 268 (2008) (discussing schools’ uses of the juvenile justice system as a 
disciplinary tool). 
 134. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 132, at 7; THE C.R. PROJECT AT HARV.  
UNIV. & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING 
CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (2000) [hereinafter HARV. 
UNIV. C.R. PROJECT]. 
 135. HARV. UNIV. C.R. PROJECT, supra note 134, at 15; CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 3, 113-14 (2010). 
 136. See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, THE C.R. PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES 
SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6-7 (2012), 
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-rem 
edies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportu 
nity-suspended-2012.pdf. 
 137. THE SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE URGENCY OF NOW: THE SCHOTT 50 
STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 7 (2012), available at 
http://blackboysreport.org/urgency-of-now.pdf. 
 138. ED Data Express: Data About Elementary & Secondary Schools in the U.S., DEP’T 
OF EDUC., http://eddataexpress.ed.gov/state-tables-main.cfm (last visited June 29, 2014) 
(select “All States” under section one; then select “Achievement Data” under section three; 
then select “Graduation Rate Data”; then select “Display Report” at the bottom of the 
page); Michael Harris, New National Data Shows Racial Disparities in School Discipline, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2012/apr_jun_2012/ 
new_national_data_shows_racial_disparities_in_school_discipline/#sdfootnote1sym (last visit-
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were more than three and a half times as likely to be suspended or 
expelled as white students.139 More than 70% of students arrested in 
school or referred to law enforcement were Hispanic or black.140 Stud-
ies also confirm that these disparities cannot be explained by worse 
behavior or socioeconomic status.141 
 These disparities in school discipline rates have consequences be-
yond the disparity in graduation rates. In an analysis of the data 
released by the Department of Education, the Center for American 
Progress found: 
Students who were suspended or expelled for even one discretion-
ary violation in Texas were 2.85 times more likely than their peers 
to be in contact with the juvenile justice system within the follow-
ing year. Each subsequent violation exponentially increased [a] 
student’s chances of juvenile justice involvement—nearly half (46 
percent) of students with at least 11 disciplinary actions came into 
contact with the juvenile justice system, compared to only 2.4 per-
cent of students with no disciplinary violations.142 
 In 2009, the arrest rate for juveniles aged 10-17 per 100,000 peo-
ple was 4,644.3 for whites but 10,096.3 for blacks.143 The Department 
of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
notes also that “between 1980 and 2010, the total juvenile arrest rate 
decreased 54% for Asians, 51% for American Indians, and 30% for 
whites, while the overall rate for black juveniles increased 8% during 
this period.”144 Black juveniles constituted 16% of this age group but 
51% of arrests for violent crimes and 33% of arrests for property 
crimes.145 After they are arrested, black juveniles represent 31% of 
                                                                                                                  
ed June 29, 2014). The New York Times analysis of the data noted that in districts with 
expulsions under zero tolerance policies, Hispanic and black students represented 45% of 
students but 56% of those expelled. Tamar Lewin, Black Students Punished More, Data 
Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A11. 
 139. Harris, supra note 138. 
 140. Lewin, supra note 138. 
 141. See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 136, at 32. 
 142. Rachel Wilf, Disparities in School Discipline Move Students of Color Toward Pris-
on, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/ 
news/2012/03/13/11350/disparities-in-school-discipline-move-students-of-color-toward-prison/. 
 143. Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, 
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05260&text=yes (last visited June 
29, 2014).  
 144. Id.  
 145. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. 
PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2009 (2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/ 
236477.pdf. 




referrals to juvenile court and 41% of waivers to adult court.146  
In 2008, 37.2% of black men with less than a high school education 
were incarcerated.147  
 As with public defense systems, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
demonstrate that educators and school administrators are intention-
ally discriminating against children of color.148 Some scholars have 
advocated for education reform via the few remaining traditional 
desegregation cases stemming from Brown and its progeny.149 While 
this strategy would indeed provide plaintiffs seeking to shut down 
some aspects of the school-to-prison pipeline with some measure of 
relief under the Equal Protection Clause, these cases are exceptions 
that prove the rule: few districts remain under desegregation orders 
and their issuance depended upon the very discriminatory intent so 
difficult to demonstrate today. As a result, reformers have evidenced 
little desire to return to the old racial justice paradigm of equal pro-
tection litigation to combat the pipeline. 
                                                                                                                  
 146. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reduc 
ingracialdisparity.pdf. 
 147. PETTIT, supra note 2, at 15. 
 148. See, e.g., Chauncee D. Smith, Note, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating 
School-to-Prison Pipeline Equal Protection Cases Through a Structural Racism Framework, 
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1026-28 (2009). Smith notes:  
[H]istorical and present-day actions that contribute to the pipeline can be cate-
gorized into three dimensions—criminalization, sorting, and economic policy. 
Together, these dimensions form a structural racism framework that largely 
encompasses the dynamic nature of disparate minority student pushout and in-
carceration. Thus, in contrast to a motive-centered approach, evaluating the 
pipeline’s criminalization, sorting and economic dimensions reveals how frag-
mented inequities have a drastically unequal cumulative impact on students  
of color. 
Id. at 1026-27; see also Russell J. Skiba et al., African American Disproportionality in 
School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1071, 1074 (2009/10) (“A similar analysis in the area of racial disparities in discipline 
shows a distinct gap between the scientific knowledge base regarding racial disparities in 
discipline and the absence of a legal strategy accepted by the courts to address such dispar-
ities. Analysis of case law reveals that this gap appears to be related to the court’s adher-
ence to a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 423, 426-27 (2012). 
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 2.   The Reform Response150 
 (a)   Claims Under the Equal Protection  Clause 
 There is surprisingly little difference in the outcomes of cases 
challenging racial disparities under the Equal Protection Clause in 
the imposition of school discipline before and after Washington v. 
Davis: claims that succeed involve either (1) a flat-out admission of 
racial discrimination or (2) evidence that white students were either 
not disciplined at all for the same infractions or disciplined less 
harshly. Neither of these elements is easy to come by and claims 
based purely upon disparate impact have never had great success.   
 Both before and after Davis, courts have been satisfied by open 
admissions of racial discrimination. In Hawkins v. Coleman, a 1974 
case, the Northern District of Texas upheld a claim based upon sta-
tistical evidence demonstrating black students were disciplined more 
frequently than white students.151 But the school district had been 
segregated until three years before the court’s opinion was issued,152 
and the superintendent of the school district testified in the case that 
the high number of suspensions of black students was because “ ‘we 
are a White controlled institution, institutional racism, [and] racism 
among individuals.’ ”153 Similarly, in 1985, in Sherpell v. Humnoke 
School District No. 5 of Lonoke County, Arkansas,154 the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas ruled in favor of plaintiffs where there was evidence 
teachers referred to black students as “niggers,” “blue-gums,” and 
“coon.”155 In Mayorga Santamaria v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
trict,156 the Northern District of Texas found in favor of plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                  
 150. This Part provides only a brief overview of the reform response to the school-to-
prison pipeline problem to illustrate the direction reformers have taken away from claims 
under the Equal Protection Clause and towards other alternatives.  It also omits discussion 
of claims for individual relief, e.g. claims brought on behalf of a single child to petition for 
services under a statute or to challenge an individual instance of school discipline.  For a 
much more comprehensive discussion of the reform response, see generally KIM ET AL., 
supra note 135; Frances P. Solari & Julienne E.M. Balshaw, Outlawed and Exiled: Zero 
Tolerance and Second Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools, 29 N.C. CENT. 
L.J. 147 (2007). 
 151. 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974). 
 152. Id. at 1331. 
 153. Id. at 1336.   
 154. 619 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Ark. 1985). 
 155. Id. at 673. A teacher in Sherpell also testified she “personally witnessed the disci-
pline of a black child by an administrative official which resulted in broken skin and blood; 
that during [her] nine-year tenure, she had not witnessed any white child subjected to such 
treatment.” Id. at 674; cf. Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 
1983) (permitting equal protection claim to proceed because “plaintiffs pleaded intent and 
purpose to discriminate on the part of the defendants”). 
 156. No. Civ.A.3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL 3550194 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006). 




equal protection claim where there was evidence that school adminis-
trators had intentionally and explicitly segregated students by race 
and national origin.157 
 Both before and after Davis, courts have required plaintiffs lack-
ing evidence of intentional discrimination to demonstrate not just 
statistical disparity in the imposition of discipline, but evidence that 
white students were not similarly disciplined for similar infrac-
tions.158 And even where some evidence is offered that white students 
were not similarly disciplined, courts have been reluctant to grant 
relief unless the students are nearly identically situated.159 These 
claims are most likely to succeed when there is evidence that two 
students involved in a fight were treated differently. For example, in 
Payne v. Worthington Schools,160 the (black) plaintiff was given a one-
day, in-school suspension and the school merely called the other 
(white) child’s parents.161 Similarly, in Antoine v. Winner School Dis-
trict,162 plaintiffs were able to secure a consent decree in part  
because they offered not only statistical evidence of disparate disci-
pline but also evidence that Native American students were disci-
                                                                                                                  
 157. Id. at *32-39; see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed. Sch. Dist. #205, 851 
F. Supp. 905, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (upholding equal protection claim where school adminis-
trators intentionally segregated students).  
 158. See, e.g., Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A]bsent a showing 
of arbitrary disciplinary practices, undeserved or unreasonable punishment of black stu-
dents, or failure to discipline white students for similar misconduct, the plaintiffs have not 
satisfied their burden of proving that the disproportionate punishment of black students in 
the [school district] is the product of a racially discriminatory purpose.”); Sweet v. Childs, 
507 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1975) (“There was no showing of arbitrary suspensions or ex-
pulsions of black students nor of a failure to suspend or expel white students for similar 
conduct.”); Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Ed. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 
(C.D. Ill. 2000) ([“Plaintiffs’] statistics failed to establish that any similarly situated Cauca-
sian students were treated less harshly.”), aff’d on other grounds, 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 
2001); Collins v. Chichester Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 96-6039, 1998 WL 351718, at *6 (E.D. 
Penn. June 29, 1998); Parker v. Trinity High Sch., 823 F. Supp. 511, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(“Plaintiffs must show that those who determined the punishment improperly considered 
plaintiffs’ race. Stray remarks by nondecisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the discipli-
nary decision process do not satisfy this burden.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Tasby, 643 F.2d at 1107 n.1 (noting that “the statistics offered are based 
upon a breakdown of offenses far too general to prove disproportionate severity in punish-
ment . . . [and] do not reflect other relevant circumstances surrounding each individual 
case of punishment . . . [such as] prior offenses”); Parker, 823 F. Supp. at 520 (refusing to 
grant relief in part because evidence that white students were not disciplined for fighting 
did “not represent a similar, repeated disregard for the authority of the teachers”). 
 160. Payne v. Worthington Sch., No. C2-99-830, 2001 WL 506509 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2001). 
 161. Id. at *8. 
 162. Consent Decree, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. Civ. 06-3007 (D.S.D.  
Dec. 10, 2007). 
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plined more harshly than Caucasian students for participating in the 
same fights.163 
 (b)   Other Constitutional Claims 
 Absent the presence of these particularly egregious indicators of 
racial discrimination, reformers have had to rely upon other claims  
to combat the school-to-prison pipeline and its effects on children of 
color. This Part will focus primarily on the use of statutory claims as 
an alternative to the Equal Protection Clause, but as with indigent 
defense reform, claims under other constitutional guarantees are  
also effective. 
 Thus, in Antoine v. Winner School District, plaintiffs sought relief 
under the Fifth Amendment and successfully obtained a settlement 
agreement where school administrators routinely obtained confes-
sions from students that were then used to prosecute them in juve-
nile court.164 Plaintiffs have similarly invoked the Due Process Clause 
to challenge school discipline—most prominently in Goss v. Lopez,165 
which resulted in a Supreme Court decision that students have due 
process rights at school disciplinary proceedings166—and the Fourth 
Amendment to challenge school searches.167  
 Plaintiffs have also attempted to seek relief under a variety of 
common law tort claim theories, including negligence and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, but with only a handful of exceptions, 
these claims have largely failed.168 Setting aside the practical difficul-
                                                                                                                  
 163. Complaint at 15, 25, 30, Antoine, No. Civ. 06-3007. 
 164. Consent Decree at 2-3, Antoine, No. Civ. 06-3007. 
 165. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
 166. Id. at 574; see also, e.g., Ruiz v. Pedota, 321 F. Supp. 2d 538, 540-41, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (approving settlement agreement in suit challenging exclusions of students from 
school in violation of Due Process Clause); D.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 879 A.2d 408, 419 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding students have right to opportunity to be heard prior to 
being transferred to an alternative school and, incidentally, declining to address state 
equal protection claim). 
 167. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374-75 (2009) 
(invalidating strip search of student); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to students searched by school officials); Doe 
v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d, 349, 356 (8th Cir. 2004) (invalidating mass search of 
entire student body); Atlanta Independent School System Officials Will Ensure Students’ 
Constitutional Rights Are Upheld After Settlement Of ACLU Lawsuit, AM. C.L. UNION (Dec. 
16, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/atlanta-independent-school-system-officials-will- 
ensure-students-constitutional-right (describing settlement agreement that included end to 
searches without reasonable suspicion). 
 168. See, e.g., Rembert v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 95-4818 (JEI), 1997 WL 
189318, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 1997) (dismissing tort claims as being time-barred); Jackson 
v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1306 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim because conduct was not sufficiently extreme or out-
rageous and negligence claims because of official immunity of defendants). 




ties in making out these claims, such as the need to overcome various 
immunity doctrines, the very nature of tort relief is simply ineffective 
at combating structural racial inequalities.169 
 (c)   The Statutory Alternative 
 Reformers have had greater success with claims for statutory  
relief, even (or particularly) where their statutory rights are not  
explicitly premised on racial equality. Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, for example, prohibits discrimination on the basis of  
race, color, or national origin in programs or activities receiving fed-
eral funding.170 But because plaintiffs must still show discriminatory  
intent to prevail on a Title VI disparate impact claim,171 such claims 
can be nearly as difficult to make out as those under the Equal  
Protection Clause.172  
 The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, 
which requires states participating in a federal funding program  
to address disproportionate minority contact (DMC) within the juve-
nile justice system, has proven somewhat more helpful.173  For exam-
ple, the Department of Justice and a Tennessee juvenile court (in a 
jurisdiction where black children made up 97.8% of all juveniles re-
ferred to court) recently entered into an agreement to gather DMC 
                                                                                                                  
 169. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 90-91 (1978); Richard L. Abel, 
A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809 (1990); Chiang, supra note 133, at 680-82. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); see also § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation). Plaintiffs filing claims under Title VII are of course still free to allege disparate 
impact as a basis for relief, see § 2000e-2(k), and a fair amount has been written about the 
relationship between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, 
Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors – Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballpark 
from Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (discussing relationship between Title 
VII and equal protection in the context of affirmative action); Richard Primus, The Future 
of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342-43 (2010) (querying whether Title VII’s 
disparate impact standard conflicts with equal protection doctrine); see also Ricci v. DeSte-
fano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate 
impact and equal protection will be raised sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin 
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”).   
 171. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (noting that Title VI prohibits 
only intentional discrimination).  
 172. See, e.g., Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 2001) (dis-
missing plaintiff’s Title VII claim for failing to prove discriminatory intent in promotion 
practices); Barnett v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., No. 3:04-CV-0763, 2006 WL 3423872, at *12 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (dismissing claim for failure to show disparate treatment); Brown 
v. City of Grand Prairie, No. CIV.A. 3:01–CV–0139, 2002 WL 171728, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
29, 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s equal protection claim for failure to prove discriminatory 
intent); Jackson, 951 F. Supp. at 1300 (dismissing Title VI claim for failure to prove  
discriminatory intent).  
 173. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) 
(2006). 
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data to seek alternatives to juvenile detention, to train juvenile court 
staff on racial bias recognition and reduction, and to form a plan to  
reduce DMC.174  
 The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) contains a number of race-
conscious accountability requirements and is explicitly directed at 
“closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing chil-
dren, especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonmi-
nority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more 
advantaged peers.”175 Its efficacy as a tool for reform, however, has 
been largely limited to the data collection it enables.176 For the first 
time, advocates are able to access education statistics disaggregated 
by race; although the disparate impact those statistics indicate may 
be insufficient for an equal protection claim, knowledge of its exist-
ence helps reformers to know they are targeting the right school  
or schools.177 
 Other federal statutes that do not explicitly address race have 
proven even more fruitful for litigators. Although there is no one 
statute suitable for every school-to-prison pipeline claim, or even 
most such claims, and although some claims cannot be addressed by 
an existing statute, the statutory landscape is sufficiently rich to 
provide a meaningful alternative to the Equal Protection Clause, 
particularly when one considers the overlap between the groups tar-
geted for statutory protection and children of color. 
 The Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) provides protec-
tions for children who do not speak English as a native language.178 
Many if not all of these children are children of color, and many suf-
fer from the effects of the school-to-prison pipeline.179 The EEOA re-
                                                                                                                  
 174. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING THE 
JUVENILE COURT OF MEMPHIS AND SHELBY COUNTY 21-23, 26 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/shelbycountyjuv_agreement_12-17-12.pdf. Accord-
ing to the Department of Justice, twenty-three states have full-time, state-level, DMC coordi-
nators; thirty-one states have part-time or other state-level staff designated as DMC coordi-
nators; thirty-four states have invested in targeted local DMC-reduction sites; and twelve states 
have laws intended to reduce DMC. JEFF SLOWIKOWSKI, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. 
PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 3 (Oct. 2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228306.pdf. 
 175. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2012). 
 176. Some have criticized NCLB for increasing school incentives to push low-
performing students of color out of schools. See, e.g., Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial 
Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s Race-Conscious 
Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 290-94 (2004). 
 177. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1907, 115 Stat. 
1425 (2002) (requiring states to collect school district data on annual school dropout rates 
disaggregated by race and ethnicity). 
 178. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012). 
 179. KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 44. 




quires state and local educational agencies to help children with lan-
guage barriers overcome those barriers and to provide them with an 
adequate education.180 In particular, it mandates that English Lan-
guage Learner students be provided with an education equal to that 
provided to native English speakers and that they be instructed in 
English.181 Reformers have filed cases both directly under the EEOA 
and through the U.S. Department of Education, Civil Rights Division 
to enforce these provisions.182 
 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),183 section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act,184 and Title II provide an array of pro-
tections for students with disabilities.185 Black students are often 
over-identified for certain types of disabilities and under-identified 
for others.186 Disabled students of color are segregated from main-
stream education more often than disabled white students.187 Disa-
                                                                                                                  
 180. § 1703(b), (f).  
 181. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 182. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(dismissing equal protection claim for failure to allege intent to discriminate but permit-
ting EEOA claim to proceed); Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1015 (denying Title VI claim for lack 
of intent to discriminate but remanding for further proceedings on EEOA claim); Flores v. 
Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1239 (D. Ariz. 2000) (holding that state disbursement of 150 
dollars per Limited English Proficient student violated the EEOA by providing insufficient 
English instruction for students not proficient in English); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE LEWISTON, ME SCHOOL 
DEPARTMENT 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/Lew 
istonAgree.pdf); Letter from March Roosevelt, Superintendent of Pittsburgh Pub. Schools, 
to Michael Branigan, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 15, 2006) (on file with author) (listing ac-
tions district will take to provide required services to Somali-speaking students); see also 
Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to take appro-
priate actions to overcome language barriers is unlawful); Martin Luther King Jr. Elemen-
tary Sch. Child. v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 1390-91 (E.D. Mich. 1979) 
(holding that school district is obligated to develop a program to assist teachers to take 
home language into account in addressing children’s reading problems). 
 183. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1410 (2012). 
 184. Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)). 
 185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006). 
 186. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 29TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2007 123, 129 
(2010) (noting that on average, across all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 1.81% of 
black students ages six through twenty-one were labeled mentally retarded, and 1.37% 
were labeled emotionally disturbed, whereas white students in that age range were given 
those labels nearly three times less often). 
 187. See, e.g., KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 54 (“Racial disparities are most pro-
nounced among those students who are educated in regular schools but in settings that are 
separate from their nondisabled peers for more than 60 percent of the school day.”). Sys-
tematic segregation from mainstream education can also occur when students of color with 
disabilities are disproportionately punished with out-of-school suspension. LOSEN & 
GILLESPIE, supra note 136, at 12-21 (noting that students of color with special needs “face 
double the risk” for suspension compared with their non-disabled peers). 
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bled black students are disciplined more frequently and more severe-
ly than their white counterparts.188 And disabled black students re-
ceive supports and services that are inferior to those given to their 
white counterparts.189  
 The IDEA guarantees children with disabilities a free and appro-
priate public education in the least restrictive environment and in 
accordance with an individualized education plan;190 requires states 
to make affirmative efforts to identify children with disabilities;191 
prohibits schools from disciplining disabled students without first 
establishing that the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of his 
or her disability;192 and requires schools to put together a behavior 
intervention plan when the misconduct at issue was in fact a mani-
festation of a disability.193 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 prohibits recipients of federal funding from discriminating on 
the basis of disability, and Title II prohibits such discrimination by 
public schools and state departments of education regardless of the 
receipt of federal funding.194 Advocates have had success filing chal-
lenges under a number of these provisions.195 
                                                                                                                  
 188. See, e.g., KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 170 n.22 (noting black students represent-
ed nearly half of all of the reported suspensions longer than ten days in 2005 for students 
with disabilities); DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, THE C.R. PROJECT, OUT OF 
SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH 
SCHOOLS 11 (2013) (finding that 36% of all black male students with disabilities enrolled in 
middle and high schools were suspended at least once in 2009-2010, compared to 17% for 
white males with disabilities, and 6% for white females with disabilities).  
 189. David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African 
American Youth in Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in RACIAL INEQUITY 
IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 93, 93-116 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002). 
 190. 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2012). 
 191. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
 192. 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c), (e)(1)-(2) (2013). 
 193. Id. § 300.530(f)(1)(i)-(ii). 
 194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006); Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)). 
 195. See, e.g., Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (deny-
ing summary judgment under Rehabilitation Act because plaintiffs failed to prove discrim-
ination against disabled children but granting injunctive relief under IDEA); Corey H. v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 995 F. Supp. 900, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (granting injunctive relief under 
IDEA for class of disabled children in Chicago); Order Preliminary Approving Settlement, 
Directing Notice to the Class and Setting a Hearing on Proposed Settlement, Ray M. v. Bd. 
of Educ. of N.Y.C., 884 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 94 Civ. 1103 (EHN)/(JLC)) 
(providing preliminary approval of settlement in case involving disabled preschool students 
who had not been evaluated for special education services in their native language); Set-
tlement Agreement, Kina K. ex rel. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., No. 01-C-0928 
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2008); Settlement Agreement at 1, P.J. v. Conn., Bd. of Educ., Civil 
Action No. 291CV00180 (RNC) (D. Conn. filed May 31, 2002) (settling IDEA case that 
covered all mentally retarded school-aged children in Connecticut). 




 The McKinney Vento Act provides education protections for stu-
dents who are homeless or in foster care, requiring that: students 
who fall under its ambit be permitted to attend either their local 
school or school of origin (and be provided transportation if they wish 
to stay at their school of origin); such students be permitted to enroll 
at a new school even if unable to produce documents such as proof of 
residency or medical records; and such students receive services un-
der Title I, Part A, of NCLB.196 Although statistics on the racial com-
position of homeless students are hard to come by, there is evidence 
that children under eighteen form a disproportionate percentage of 
the homeless population, which is in turn disproportionately of col-
or.197 Reformers have had success filing claims under the McKinney 
Vento Act, particularly in the aftermath of natural disasters such as 
Hurricane Katrina.198 
 3.   Beyond the School-to-Prison Pipeline—Lessons for Other 
Claims 
 When statutory relief is available, it is a powerful resource for 
advocates seeking to address racial disparities. Reformers in the 
school-to-prison pipeline context have had the greatest success when 
they have based their claims not on disparate impact, but rather  
on statutory rights to which anyone would be entitled—a legislative 
equivalent to the “liberty-based claim” referred to by Yoshino  
and others.  
 The statutory and regulatory regime is complex and wide-ranging. 
This Part covered only a handful of federal statutes relevant for pipe-
line purposes, but reformers seeking to address any sort of racial 
disparity look to state statutes as well. And even where there is no 
private right of action under a particular statute, the history of 
school-to-prison pipeline reform demonstrates that relief may never-
theless be available through work with government agencies or 
branches leveraging the statutory entitlements. 
                                                                                                                  
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(1)(J)(iii)(I), (g)(3)(C)(i), (g)(4)(A)-(B) (2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Who Is Homeless?, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS (July 2009), 
http://nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/who.html (noting that in 2003, children under eight-
een comprised 39% of the homeless population and that a survey of twenty-five cities in 
2006 indicated that the sheltered homeless population was 42% African-American). 
 198. See, e.g., Order at 1-2, Boisseau v. Picard, Civil Action No. 07-00565 (E.D. La. Jan. 
7, 2008) (dismissing case following settlement of claims on behalf of children made home-
less by Hurricane Katrina); see also Permanent Injunction at 1, Bullock v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Montgomery Cnty., Civil Action No. DKC02CV798 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2005) (enjoining school 
district to permit homeless children to attend any school in the feeder system for the school 
the student attended prior to homelessness, and to provide transportation services). 
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 Where explicitly race-based statutory protections are available, 
reformers do and should make use of those protections. For example, 
the ACLU’s Racial Justice Project recently sued Morgan Stanley for 
the disparate impact its sub-prime lending practices had on people of 
color in Detroit, relying primarily on the federal Fair Housing Act 
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibit racial discrim-
ination in residential real estate and credit transactions.199  
 But the availability of federal statutory relief for claims based on 
racial disparity in the absence of discriminatory intent appears to be 
on the wane. Indeed, lower court skepticism about the substantive 
merit of claims under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (an Act 
grounded in the Fifteenth Amendment and containing protections 
explicitly designed to protect racial minorities),200 has recently given 
way to a Supreme Court decision that holds section 4 of the Act un-
constitutional.201 This Part catalogs some of the ways one group of 
reformers has attempted to address this problem and urges those 
who have not previously considered racially neutral statutory claims 
to do so. 
C.   Immigration, Structural Arguments, and Racial Animus 
 Over the last decade, a number of states and localities have craft-
ed legislation designed to discourage undocumented workers from 
entering their jurisdictions and to encourage those already present to 
leave. The bills passed typically contain some combination of the fol-
lowing provisions:202 prohibitions on transporting or concealing un-
                                                                                                                  
 199. Class Action Complaint at 1-3, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CIV 7667(HB), 
2013 WL 3835198 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012). The case survived a motion to dismiss. Adkins 
v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 Civ. 7667(HB), 2013 WL 3835198 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013). 
 200. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(upholding South Carolina Voter Identification Act under section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act); Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 321-22, 353 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying 
claim that change in voting procedures would have retrogressive effect on minority voters 
in violation of Voting Rights Act and finding procedures were not enacted with discrimina-
tory purpose); Perez v. Texas, 891 F. Supp. 2d 808, 834-35 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (denying claim 
that congressional redistricting constituted impermissible racial gerrymander in violation 
of Voting Rights Act). But see Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 143-44 (D.C.C. 2012) 
(denying motion state request for declaratory judgment that voter identification law did 
not violate the Voting Rights Act), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). 
 201. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 24 (U.S. June 25, 2013). In so holding, 
the Court repeatedly emphasized its view that minority voters no longer suffer any dispar-
ate impact as a result of state and local voting laws.  See id. at 4 (“Census Bureau data 
indicate that African-American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in 
five of the six States originally covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one 
half of one percent.”).   
 202. This list is by no means comprehensive. According to the National Conference on 
State Legislatures, lawmakers in forty-six states and the District of Columbia introduced 
948 bills and resolutions related to immigration, and enacted 114 of those bills and adopted 
 




documented workers,203 inducing an undocumented worker to enter 
the state,204 and/or hiring an undocumented worker;205 requirements 
related to documentation immigrants must produce or can use to 
verify the lawfulness of their presence in the jurisdiction;206 providing 
for additional state penalties for violating federal law;207 and/or au-
thorizing local law enforcement to determine whether a person is 
removable or detainable under federal law.208 This Part will explore 
                                                                                                                  
92 of those resolutions in the first half of 2012 alone. This flurry of activity actually marked 
a decline from 2011. 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Janu-
ary 1 – June 30, 2012), NAT’L CONF. ON ST. LEGS. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions.aspx.   
 203. See, e.g., Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010) (prohibiting the harbor-
ing of an illegal alien); H.R. 87, § 7, 151st Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (codi-
fied at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-200 (West 2014)) (prohibiting the transport or movement of 
an illegal alien “for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien in the United 
States” and the concealment or harboring of an illegal alien); H.R. 56, § 13, 2011 Reg. Sess. 
(Ala. 2011) (codified at ALA. CODE  § 31-13-13(a)(1), (3) (2014)) (prohibiting the conceal-
ment, harboring or shielding from detection of any alien, as well as transporting an alien 
“in furtherance of the unlawful presence of the alien”); S. 20, § 4, 119th Gen. Assemb., Sess. 
(S.C. 2011) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (2014)) (making it a state crime for un-
lawfully present persons to shelter, harbor or transport themselves). 
 204. ALA. CODE § 31-13-13(a)(2) (2014); H.R. 87, § 7 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
202(b) (West 2014)) (prohibiting people from inducing an illegal alien to enter into Georgia). 
 205. ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a) (2014) (criminalizing an unauthorized alien’s application 
for, solicitation of, or performance of work); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2014) 
(making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the 
state); Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 5(C) (June 21, 2010) (requiring employers to 
execute an affidavit that they have not knowingly employed any unauthorized aliens); S. 
20, § 2 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-14-10(9) (2014)) (creating sanctions on employers 
who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens). 
 206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2014) (requiring officers in some circumstanc-
es to verify immigration status when conducting a stop, detention, or arrest); H.R. 87, § 8 
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (West 2014)) (authorizing but not requiring state 
officials to conduct inquiry into immigration status); S. 590, § 18, 117th Gen. Assemb., First 
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (codified at IND. CODE § 34-28-8.2-2 (2013)) (making it an infraction to 
knowingly offer or accept a consular identification card as a valid form of identification). 
 207. ALA. CODE § 31-13-10(a) (2014) (also making failure to comply with federal alien 
registration requirements a state misdemeanor); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2014) 
(making failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements a state misdemean-
or); S. 20, § 5 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-740 (2014)) (also making failure to comply 
with federal alien registration requirements a state misdemeanor). 
 208. ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (2014) (requiring officers to determine immigration sta-
tus when officer has reasonable suspicion a lawfully seized individual is unlawfully pre-
sent); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2014) (authorizing local law enforcement to 
arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has com-
mitted any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(e) (West 2014) (authorizing local law enforcement to detain unau-
thorized aliens, to transport them to a detention facility, and/or to notify the Department of 
Homeland Security); S. 590, § 19 (codified at IND. CODE § 35-33-1-1(a)(11), (12), (13) (2013)) 
(authorizing officials to make warrantless arrests of individuals when the officer has a 
removal order issued by an immigration court, a detainer or notice of action issued by the 
Department of Homeland Security, or the officer has probable cause to believe the person 
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the traditional equal protection claims available to combat any dis-
parate racial impact these bills may have and identify the non-
traditional legal challenges reformers have brought to bear in lieu of, 
or in addition to, equal protection claims.  
 1.   The Disparate Impact 
 Setting aside the facial classifications on the basis of citizenship or 
alienage presented by these bills, this type of legislation also presents 
the type of racial disparate impact problem in which this Article is 
primarily interested. The reform response to these bills is animated 
largely by a suspicion that their enforcement will disproportionately 
target undocumented people of color, and more broadly, all persons 
who look Latino, regardless of actual ethnic heritage or legal sta-
tus.209  
 A number of these immigration bills contain provisions calculated 
to inoculate the laws from traditional equal protection challenges by 
specifically prohibiting consideration of race, color, or national origin 
except as authorized by state and federal constitutions, and by re-
quiring that implementation be consistent with federal laws govern-
ing civil rights.210 They explicitly disavow discriminatory intent and 
thus seek to foreclose any cause of action via Washington v. Davis. 
Although there may be some atmospheric evidence of discriminatory 
intent, reformers seeking to combat the anticipated racial disparate 






                                                                                                                  
has been indicted for or convicted of one or more aggravated felonies); Fremont, Neb. Ordi-
nance 5165, § 4(D) (June 21, 2010)  (requiring city police to verify immigration status of 
building occupants who have not declared themselves to be U.S. citizens and to revoke 
occupancy licenses for unauthorized aliens); S. 20, § 6 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-
170(A) (2014)) (requiring officers to determine immigration status when there is reasonable 
suspicion a person being stopped or arrested is present unlawfully). 
 209. See, e.g., State Anti-Immigration Laws, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.org/ 
immigrants-rights/state-anti-immigrant-laws (last visited June 29, 2014) (“Laws inspired 
by Arizona’s SB 1070 invite rampant racial profiling against Latinos, Asian-Americans and 
others presumed to be ‘foreign’ based on how they look or sound.”).  
 210. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B), (L) (2014); H.R. 87, § 8 (codified at GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-5-100(d) (West 2014)), 2011 Ga. Laws 794, 805.  
 211. See, e.g., Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1192-93 (M.D. 
Ala. 2011) (stating that legislative history shows discriminatory intent behind Alabama 
immigration laws). 




 2.   The Reform Response 
 (a)   Facial Classification Based on Alienage 
 As a whole, immigration-related bills, like problems with state 
public defense systems and the school-to-prison pipeline, have not 
proven particularly amenable to equal protection challenges.212 The 
bills largely target undocumented immigrants, who do not qualify as 
a protected class and thus receive only rational basis review under 
traditional equal protection analysis.213 To the extent that advocates 
have attempted to make claims based upon disparate racial impact, 
they have been foreclosed by the problem at the heart of this Article: 
the requirement of discriminatory intent.214 
 The legislation has presented reformers seeking to combat racial 
disparity with some low-hanging fruit, however. First, unlike the 
previous two types of state action described, the immigration-related 
bills sometimes present a facial classification based upon alienage 
(citizenship), which is a protected class entitled to heightened scruti-
ny.215 Discrimination on the basis of citizenship or nationality is often 
inextricably linked with discrimination on the basis of race. Second, 
although state action involving the classification of undocumented 
adult aliens receives only rational basis review, it still must survive 
at least that minimal level of scrutiny.216 And finally, the undocu-
mented children of undocumented aliens may qualify for some addi-
tional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.217  
 At least some of the bills in question have proven vulnerable on 
each of these fronts. It is worth noting that although these successful 
claims rely on the Equal Protection Clause, they rely on a race-
neutral aspect of the Clause. In Buquer v. Indianapolis,218 for exam-
ple, the court found that a provision barring use of consular identifi-
cation cards as valid identification did not satisfy rational basis re-
view under equal protection analysis because it was “designed simply 
                                                                                                                  
 212. See, e.g., Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 975 (D. Neb. 2012) (reject-
ing equal protection challenge to various immigration related bills because city articulated 
a rational basis for the different treatment afforded adults who are lawfully present and 
those who are not).  
 213. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
 214. See, e.g., Keller, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (holding plaintiffs failed to state a claim 
based upon disparate impact, because they failed to show discriminatory intent). 
 215. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
 216. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-25. 
 217. Id. at 216-17. 
 218. 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 
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to target foreign nationals.”219 Similarly, in Hispanic Interest Coali-
tion of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama,220 the Eleventh Circuit 
found that a state requirement that elementary and secondary 
schools determine the immigration status of students violated Equal 
Protection because the asserted state interest in collecting such in-
formation was insufficiently compelling and would impermissibly 
burden the right of such children to obtain an education.221 In Ruiz v. 
Robinson,222 the Southern District of Florida found unconstitutional a 
state law that denied in-state tuition benefits to U.S. citizen students 
who could not prove the federal immigration status of their par-
ents.223 The court reasoned that the facial classification upon which 
the statute rested (between U.S.-citizen students who could provide 
immigration papers for their parents versus those who could not) 
required heightened scrutiny because it punished citizen children for 
the acts of their parents and that the classification failed to survive 
that level of scrutiny.224 
 (b)   Federal Preemption 
 The most successful across-the-board line of attack on these types 
of bills has been a structural argument that these provisions are 
preempted by federal law. The state legislation described follows a 
long history of anti-immigrant legislation in this country, at least two 
previous waves of which the Supreme Court has also dealt with on 
federal preemption grounds.225  This time around, the Court ruled in 
Arizona v. United States that three of the four key Arizona immigra-
tion law provisions were federally preempted.226 State and local laws 
may be preempted in one of three ways: express preemption, in which 
Congress explicitly withdraws specified powers from the states via 
statute; field preemption, in which Congress determines that an en-
tire area of the law must be regulated by the federal government ex-
clusively; and conflict preemption, in which compliance with both the 
                                                                                                                  
 219. Id. at 924. 
 220. 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 221. Id. at 1246-49. 
 222. 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 223. Id. at 1333. 
 224. Id. at 1331. 
 225. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941) (finding state-imposed alien 
registration requirements to be federally preempted and noting that “[o]ur Constitution 
and our Civil Rights Act have guaranteed to aliens the equal protection of the laws which 
is a pledge of the protection of equal laws” (quotation marks omitted)); Chy Lung v. Free-
man, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (finding California statute that required bond payment by 
certain foreign passengers to be federally preempted).    
 226. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). Arizona, of course, rests firmly on the shoulders of 
precedent like Hines. See generally Hines, 312 U.S. 52. 




state law and the federal law is impossible.227 In the context of immi-
gration, the Court has often emphasized the traditional federal power 
to determine immigration policy and the extensive way in which 
Congress had already done so, occupying the field.228 
 In Arizona, the Court held that the state could not make “willful 
failure to complete or carry an alien registration document” a state 
misdemeanor because Congress had occupied the entire field of alien 
registration.229 It found the state could not prohibit aliens from apply-
ing for or soliciting work because Congress had already enacted a 
“comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal 
aliens.’ ”230 And it found that the state could not deputize state law 
enforcement officials to arrest anyone who they had probable cause to 
believe had committed an offense that would make them removable 
from the United States because “[f]ederal law specifies limited cir-
cumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an 
immigration officer.”231  
 In the wake of the Court’s decision, lower courts have found a 
spate of laws patterned upon those struck down in Arizona to be 
preempted on similar grounds.232 
(c)   What Remains: Disparate Impact and a Return to the Bill of 
Rights 
 The Court’s opinion in Arizona essentially deferred decision on the 
fourth provision of the Arizona bill, which requires state officials to 
make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of 
anyone stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion 
                                                                                                                  
 227. See generally Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (summarizing basic preemption principles). 
 228. Id. at 2498-99 (“It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the 
status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer 
and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”). 
 229. Id. at 2501-02 (“[E]ven complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field 
preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, 
even if it is parallel to federal standards.”). 
 230. Id. at 2504. 
 231. Id. at 2506. For discussion of the fourth provision of the Arizona legislation, which 
the Court permitted to survive, see infra Part III.C.2.c. 
 232. See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 
1266-67 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 973 (D. Neb. 2012). Of course, some lower 
courts had already invalidated similar provisions as being preempted even before the 
Court’s decision was announced. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers 
Branch, 675 F.3d 802, 817 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 
2d 898, 917-24 (D.S.C. 2011); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 920 (S.D. 
Ind. 2011). 
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that the person is an unlawfully present alien.233 Lower courts con-
fronted by similar provisions have likewise withheld judgment.234 The 
Court has also refused to find preempted state statutes that require 
use of the federal E-Verify program to ascertain the work authoriza-
tion status of employees.235  
 Advocates seeking to challenge these two types of state action—
immigration status checks conducted by state law enforcement offi-
cials and use of E-Verify to check work authorization status—must 
look beyond preemption. Both of these types of legislation are facially 
neutral but raise potential disparate impact concerns that workers of 
certain races will be disproportionately subject to immigration or 
work authorization checks. If the enforcement of these provisions is 
sufficiently egregious with regard to racial impact, there is some 
precedent for further challenge under equal protection, but such 
claims are very difficult to make out.236  
 What remains, instead, is a return to the use of constitutional 
protections other than the Equal Protection Clause to vindicate racial 
inequality claims.237 Justice Alito acknowledges this eventuality in 
Arizona: “If properly implemented, [the show-your-papers provision] 
should not lead to federal constitutional violations, but there is no 
denying that enforcement of [the provision] will multiply the occa-
sions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up.”238  
 Some state provisions have in fact already been deemed unconsti-
tutional on Fourth Amendment and due process grounds. For exam-
ple, in Buquer v. City of Indianapolis,239 the Southern District of In-
                                                                                                                  
 233. Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, slip op. at 23-24 (U.S. June 25, 2012). The 
Court, it seems, did not see fit to take the invitation of a previous Court’s decision in Hines 
to deem such provisions similarly preempted by an implicit Congressional desire “to leave 
[aliens] free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might 
not only affect our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty 
which the law has intended guarding against.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941). 
 234. See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1268; Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1292. But 
see South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (finding state equivalent immigration status 
check requirement preempted). 
 235. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act of 2007, which permits state courts to suspend or revoke business 
licenses if an employer knowingly or intentionally employs an unauthorized alien and 
requires use of the federal E-Verify program). 
 236. It appears the Court has not struck down a restriction purely on the grounds of 
discriminatory enforcement since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).   
 237. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 238. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2529 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); cf. Hines, 312 U.S. at 71 n.32 (“The requirement that cards be 
carried and exhibited has always been regarded as one of the most objectionable features of 
proposed registration systems, for it is thought to be a feature that best lends itself to 
tyranny and intimidation.”). 
 239. 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 




diana granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined enforcement of 
a state law provision authorizing state and local officials to conduct 
warrantless arrests of individuals with outstanding federal removal 
orders. In addition to the usual preemption problems the provision 
presented,240 the court found that the provision violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it authorized arrest for non-criminal offenses 
and left a “deafening silence as to what happens to the arrestee post 
his arrest.”241 
 3.   Beyond Immigration—Lessons for Other Claims 
 The immigration cases demonstrate that even where the racial 
animus is all but explicit, reformers still gain the most traction from 
racially neutral claims. This observation holds true within the more 
limited family of equal protection claims as well: even when the race-
neutral claim is based on a factor linked to race (like citizenship), 
race-neutral equal protection claims are more likely to succeed than 
race-based claims. These cases may indicate that the more racially 
inflammatory the underlying facts, the more important it is to rely 
upon racially neutral legal claims. They also show, however, that 
there is life yet in the Equal Protection Clause and that reformers 
need not shy away from equal protection claims where they do exist, 
as in facial classifications on the basis of alienage.242 And finally, 
these cases serve as a powerful reminder that disparate racial impact 
may sometimes productively be challenged on multiple fronts. 
 Reformers have made use of federal preemption in other contexts 
as well. In a case related to the anti-immigration legislation, the Su-
preme Court recently struck down an Arizona proposition that re-
quired prospective voters to present documentary proof of citizenship 
in order to register to vote.243 So-called “voter ID” laws like this one 
have a disproportionate impact on people of color,244 who are less like-
                                                                                                                  
 240. Id. at 920. 
 241. Id. at 918; see also id. at 918-19 (“There is no mention of any requirement that  
the arrested person be brought forthwith before a judge for consideration of detention or 
release. There is in fact a complete void within the new statute regarding all other due  
process protections.”).  
 242. Cf. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 939, 1012-17 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s equal protection alienage cases 
are actually driven by preemption concerns). 
 243. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) (finding 
proposition preempted under the National Voting Rights Act via the Elections Clause).  
 244. A number of laws seeking to restrict access to voting were passed or proposed in 
the months leading up to the 2012 presidential election.  See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
VOTER PROTECTION PROGRAM, Segregating American Citizenship: Latino Voter Disenfran-
chisement in 2012 3-4 (2012), available at www.advancementproject.org/page/-/resources/ 
Latino%20Report%202012.pdf (summarizing laws). 
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ly than whites to have government issued identification.245 In a twist 
on the use of federal preemption principles, the Court relied not  
upon preemption under the Supremacy Clause, but rather under the 
Elections Clause, which gives Congress the power to make or alter 
state regulations governing the time, place, and manner of holding  
federal elections.246  
 The Court’s decision is all the more interesting in light of the 
claim that the Ninth Circuit denied, under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which provides explicitly race-based relief.247 The Ninth 
Circuit noted the need for plaintiffs seeking such relief to demon-
strate that the voting practice being challenged actually results in 
race discrimination, with a causal connection between the practice 
and the discriminatory result.248 It found that plaintiffs failed to pro-
vide evidence demonstrating even the disparate impact alleged.249 
Here, racial justice was again better served by the race-neutral struc-
tural protections of federalism and federal preemption than by the 
explicitly race-based protections conferred by federal statute. 
 Finally, courts across the country have dealt with a variety of cas-
es involving disparate racial impact, immigration, and/or allegations 
of racial animus in the post-9/11 cases. As in the other areas of law 
examined by this Article, the disparate racial impact implicated by 
these cases is relatively clear; the U.S. Government has focused al-
most exclusively on Muslims and predominantly Muslim countries in 
an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks, and largely on Middle 
                                                                                                                  
 245. See, e.g., NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VOTER ID LAWS & THE NATIVE VOTE: STATES OF 
CONCERN 4, available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_LaOnRbIuKyazjpiz 
LTzOsFxvRiBpmwxxbGVFOeCNGMFwEuLZXwz_VoterIDs_NativeVote_States_of_Concern.pdf 
(discussing the disparate impact voter ID laws have on Native Americans, noting, for example, 
that many tribal communities do not have street addresses); JON C. ROGOWSKI & CATHY J. 
COHEN, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT, TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON VOTING RIGHTS: THE 
IMPACT OF NEW PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON YOUNG PEOPLE OF COLOR 1 
(2012), available at http://research.blackyouthproject.com/files/2012/09/Youth-of-Color-and-
Photo-ID-Laws.pdf (focusing on effect of voter ID laws on young voters who are of color); 
WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., VOTING LAW CHANGES 
IN 2012 24 (2011), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/page/Democracy/VRE/ 
Brennan_Voting_Law_V10.pdf (noting that “as many as 25% of African-American voters do 
not possess a current and valid form of government issued photo ID, compared to 11% of 
voters of all races”). 
 246. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 247. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (prohibiting states from imposing voting qualifications 
that “result[] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color”). 
 248. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 249. Id. at 407. 




Eastern citizens and countries.250 Those seeking to challenge directly 
the racial justice implications of racial profiling or special registra-
tion requirements, however, have met with little success when rely-
ing on claims driven purely by equal protection.251 Race-neutral 
claims, brought under the writ of habeas corpus, due process, and/or 
federal statutes or treaties, have proven more fruitful.252 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The scenarios of racial inequality discussed above were neither 
intentionally created by a racist government cabal nor the result of 
bad state actors engaged in intentional discrimination. They arose, 
instead, out of what some scholars have identified as structural rac-
ism: the development of social institutions over time, through myriad 
government choices and actions.253 The resulting structural inequali-
ty is impossible to eradicate via the elimination of a single govern-
ment policy or targeted firings of racist employees. 
 This new racial injustice is difficult, if not impossible, to combat 
under the Court’s reading of the Equal Protection Clause, which re-
quires the ill intent of a bad government actor, that is, the racist gov-
ernment employee. It requires, moreover, a structural solution. While 
much of contemporary equal protection scholarship has focused on 
how to extend the protections of the Equal Protection Clause to new 
groups like lesbian women and gay men, this Article returns to the 
paradigmatic application of the clause to prohibit classifications 
based upon race.254 It offers an exploration of the many ways reform-
                                                                                                                  
 250. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ST., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 2 
(Sept. 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm (describing counter-terrorism 
strategy and focusing on threat from radical Islamists in the Middle East). 
 251. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682-83 (2009) (dismissing complaint for 
failing to allege facts showing petitioners “purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-
September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national 
origin”); Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438-39 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying equal protection 
challenge to special registration requirements that applied only to adult male citizens of 
Muslim majority states and North Korea because there was a rational national-security 
basis for the program). 
 252. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that aliens held 
as enemy combatants were entitled to habeas corpus hearings to challenge their deten-
tions); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (finding proposed military commis-
sions violated Uniform Code of Military Justice and did not satisfy Geneva Conventions); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (requiring that citizen held as enemy 
combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest his detention pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause). 
 253. See supra note 42. 
 254. This includes, of course, Yoshino’s article. Yoshino, supra note 9; see also Ball, 
supra note 58, at 9-12 (discussing liberty and equality based claims in context of gay 
rights); Tribe, supra note 48.  
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ers have found to fill the gaps wrought in the Equal Protection 
Clause by Davis and its progeny, and it demonstrates that reformers 
largely (and long ago) abandoned explicitly race-based claims, relying 
instead on other guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, statutory 
claims, and federal structural arguments.  
 This Article is largely a descriptive project. It takes as a given 
existing Court doctrine and recognizes—as reformers working on the 
ground already have—that different paths can be taken to achieve 
equality. But this description of today’s fight for racial equality helps 
to illuminate what equality more generally might resemble in the 
coming years, and whether and to what extent the Equal Protection 
Clause will even be relevant.  
 Facially neutral policies with a disparate racial impact will likely 
be a fact of life for some time. The continued vitality of the Equal 
Protection Clause has perhaps never been in greater question, not 
just for race, but for other groups seeking equality as well. The hard-
fought lessons racial justice reformers have learned over the years 
may soon be relevant for others seeking to challenge disparate im-
pact claims. This Article seeks to demonstrate that government poli-
cies creating such impact are not beyond the reach of the law. The 
workarounds identified herein do not present a solution to every ra-
cial inequality—sometimes a political solution may be more appro-
priate. But where a judicial fix is feasible, these workarounds point 
the way towards a new racial justice.  
